Essays in environmental and happiness economics by Otrachshenko, Vladimir
Nova School of Business and Economics
Essays in Environmental and Happiness Economics
Author: Advisors:
Vladimir Otrachshenko Professor Maria A. Cunha-e-Sá
Professor Luis Catela Nunes
March 2013

Contents
Acknoledgements iii
Preface v
Chapter 1. Protesting and Justifying: A Latent Class Model for Con-
tingent Valuation with Attitudinal Data 1
1.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4. The Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5. Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.5.1. Justification Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.A. Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.A.1. Attitudinal Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.A.2. Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.A.3. Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Chapter 2. Protest Attitudes and Stated Preferences: Evidence on
Scale Usage Heterogeneity 33
2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2. The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3. Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4. Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4.1. Scale Usage Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
i
3.A. Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.A.1. Attitudinal Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.A.2. Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.A.3. Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Chapter 3. Life (Dis)satisfaction and the Decision to Migrate: Evi-
dence from Central and Eastern Europe 55
3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2. Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.3. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3.1. The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3.2. Robustness Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.4. The Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.5. Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3.1. Individual Level Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.5.2. Country Level Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.5.3. Migration Decisions in CEE and non-CEE Countries . . . . . . 74
3.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.A. Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.A.1. Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.A.2. Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
ii
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisors, Professor Maria A. Cunha-e-Sá and Professor
Luis Catela Nunes, who always encouraged and gave valuable advice during my PhD
journey. Without their support this thesis would not have been completed. Also, I
would like to thank my coauthor Olga Popova and my friends Bernardo Pimentel,
Fazer Rahim, Nuno Sobreira, Renato Rosa, Rodrigo Araujo, and Timur Gabunya.
I gratefully acknowledge financial support from Fundação para a Ciência a Tec-
nologia (Doctoral Scholarship SFH/BD/15914/2005/) and Fundação Amelia de Mello.
iii

Preface
This dissertation consists of three chapters in the field of Environmental Economics
and Happiness Economics. The first two chapters explore the willingness-to-pay for
the landscape preservation for individuals with different attitudes. The last chapter
examines the relationship between life satisfaction and the individual decision to
migrate.
In the first chapter, we develop a latent class model for estimating willingness-
to-pay (WTP) for public goods using simultaneously contingent valuation (CV)
and attitudinal data to identify individuals with similar characteristics, such as
WTP and protest attitudes. We find evidence that the answer to the CV question
influences the responses to the attitudinal questions. In our case, this influence
reflects rational behavior (budget constraint issues) and justification biases related
to protest reasons, such as lack of trust in institutions or fairness issues with respect
to the distribution of the burden of preservation. The results from our empirical
application confirm the importance of accounting for those biases.
Frequently, survey based techniques rely on the neoclassical theory of preferences
assuming that individuals behave rationally. However, the elicited preferences are
also affected by individual attitudes. In order to capture the attitudes, follow up
questions are typically included. These questions are measured in discrete scale
ratings. The 5-point Likert scale (from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree") is
quite popular. Based on the responses to the attitudinal and SP questions, a latent
class model can then be used to identify classes of individuals with similar attitudes,
preferences and underlying WTP. However, even individuals with similar preferences
and attitudes may interpret and use the same scale ratings (categories) differently.
This phenomenon is known as scale usage heterogeneity.
v
In the second chapter, we develop a latent class model that takes into account
scale usage heterogeneity within each class. In this way, individuals are classified
into classes based on similarity of underlying attitudes and preferences. In addition,
we explore how this heterogeneity is associated with socio-economic and preference
variables. The findings of this chapter are as follows. First, we find evidence of the
presence of scale usage heterogeneity in the answers of a set of attitudinal questions
that varies across classes. Second, scale usage heterogeneity is associated with socio-
economic and preference variables. Third, scale usage heterogeneity is not related
to WTP. Finally, we also find evidence that respondents justify their response to
the CV question when answering the attitudinal questions.
In the third chapter, we provide empirical evidence of the impact of life satisfac-
tion on the individual intention to migrate. The impacts of individual characteristics
and of country macroeconomic variables on the intention to migrate are analyzed
jointly. We allow for life satisfaction to serve as a mediator between macroeco-
nomic variables and the intention to migrate. Using the Eurobarometer Survey for
27 Central Eastern European (CEE) and Western European (non-CEE) countries,
we find that people have a higher intention to migrate when dissatisfied with life.
The socio-economic variables and macroeconomic conditions affect the intention to
migrate indirectly through life satisfaction. The impact of life satisfaction on the
intention to migrate for middle-aged individuals with past experience of migration,
low level of education, and with a low or average income from urban areas is higher
in CEE countries than in non-CEE countries.
vi
Chapter 1
Protesting and Justifying: A Latent Class Model
for Contingent Valuation with Attitudinal Data
coauthored with M. A. Cunha-e-Sá, L. Madureira, and L. C. Nunes
Abstract
This article develops a latent class model for estimating willingness-to-pay (WTP)
for public goods using simultaneously contingent valuation (CV) and attitudinal
data to identify individuals with similar characteristics, such as WTP and protest
attitudes. We find evidence that the answer to the CV question influences the re-
sponses to the attitudinal questions. In our case, this influence reflects rational be-
havior (budget constraint issues) and justification biases related to protest reasons,
such as lack of trust in institutions or fairness issues with respect to the distribution
of the burden of preservation. The results from our empirical application confirm
the importance of accounting for those biases.
Keywords: contingent valuation, attitudinal data, latent class model, protest
responses, justification bias
JEL Classification: C35, C85, Q51
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1.1. Introduction
Stated preference (SP) survey techniques, such as the Contingent Valuation (CV)
approach, are widely used to elicit the economic value of public goods, such as
land preservation, biodiversity, and other environmental amenities. Often, public
agencies rely on those estimates to decide about the adoption of alternative policies.
However, many CV studies have found that some respondents do not state their
true value of the good in question (see Mitchell and Carson [33] and Carson and
Groves [9]). For instance, in open-ended formats some respondents state very high
bids (outliers) or zero willingness to pay (WTP), while in closed-ended formats some
respondents may refuse to accept any bid for reasons that are related to a rejection
of the valuation process. These are often called protest responses.1
There are many examples in the literature of different reasons for protest re-
sponses: scenario rejection, such as respondents’ beliefs that the polluter should
pay, lack of information, strategic acting, lack of trust in institutions, fairness is-
sues, disagreement with the vehicle of payment or, as Mitchell and Carson [33] (pg.
166) state, any situation leading to respondents refusing to play the game econo-
mists want them to play (see, more recently, Meyerhoff and Liebe [32], and Olsen,
Moerkbak, and Meyerhoff [36]).
The identification and treatment of protest responses have been the subject of
a wide debate in the literature in the last two decades. In fact, in the presence
of protest responses the use of standard SP methods is not able to elicit the true
economic value that would allow for optimally providing the public good at stake,
with a resulting cost to society. In order to identify protest responses, the researcher
typically relies on the answers to a set of follow-up attitudinal questions, addressing
different reasons for protesting. Examples are given by Soderqvist [42] (ethical
1The presence of protest responses has also been examined in other formats. For instance,
in Meyerhoff and Liebe [18], the authors compare CV with Choice Experiments (CE). However,
no clear pattern of differences between the two was found. Recent examples are Bonnichsen and
Ladenburg [7], [8].
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beliefs indicated by lexicographic preferences), Jakobsson and Dragun [14] (ethical
beliefs indicated by fairness aspects), Morrison, Blamey and Bennett [47] (vehicle
of payment), Strazzera, Genius, Scarpa and Hutchinson [43] (method of payment
and fairness aspects), among others. Based on those answers, different criteria
have been proposed in the literature. However, these criteria are often ad hoc. In
fact, a protest response in one study could be identified as a valid one in another.
This is illustrated in Dziegielewska and Mendelsohn [16]. After identifying protest
responses, the standard approach consists of removing protest responses from the
sample (see Mitchell and Carson [33], Whitehead, Groothuis, and Blomquist [45],
and Jorgensen, Syme, Bishop and Nancarrow [21] for a thorough discussion).2
In many studies, the attitudinal questions were only presented to the respondents
that were not willing to pay. However, Jorgensen and Syme [22] claim that protesting
reflects an attitude toward paying for the good based on a set of attitudes that are
mutually interdependent. This influences respondents’answers to theWTP question
even among those that are willing to pay. Therefore, the attitudinal questions should
be asked to all respondents (see also Carson, Mitchell, Hanemann, Kopp, Presser,
and Ruud [14], and, more recently, Meyerhoff and Liebe [17], Dziegielewska and
Mendelsohn [16], and Meyerhoff and Liebe [18]).
Recently, latent class models (LCM) have been used to endogenously identify
classes of individuals with similar characteristics, such as preferences or attitudes,
according to their responses to survey questions. Recent examples of empirical appli-
cations of LCM based on different types of data are given by Scarpa, Gilbride, Camp-
bell and Hensher [41] on landscape preferences from choice experiments, Walker and
Li [44] on household location decisions, and Scarpa and Thiene [39], Morey, Thacher,
2When protest responses are removed from the sample, a sample selection problem may occur
if the group of protestors is significantly different from the remainder of the sample. Therefore, the
estimators obtained from the reduced (non-protestors) sample may be biased. To deal with this
problem, sample selection modeling has been used in the literature not only to detect selectivity
bias but also to correct it, such as in Calia and Strazzera [11], Strazzera, Genius, Scarpa and
Hutchinson [43], Martin-López, Montes and Benayas [25], and, more recently, in Brouwer and
Martin-Ortega [10].
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and Breffl e [34], Morey, Thiene, Salvo and Signorello [35],, Bestard, Font, and Hicks
[5], Scarpa and Beharry-Borg [40], and Breffl e, Morey and Thacher [9] on recre-
ational site choice. In the context of CV studies, and Meyerhoff, Bartczak, and
Liebe [29] use a LCM to identify classes of protesters. The methodology followed
only takes into account the responses to the attitudinal questions when estimating
the latent classes. However, since the answers to the CV questions are directly af-
fected by a respondent being a protestor or not, those answers could also be used
to better infer about class membership, which is not the case in their paper.
In this paper, we contribute to this literature by considering a LCM that allows
identifying different classes of individuals using simultaneously CV and attitudinal
data capturing different reasons for protesting, thus extending the standard CV
model. We also account for the presence of potential justification biases, that is,
the possibility that for different reasons the response to the CV question affects the
answers to the attitudinal questions. The justification bias effect was first suggested
by Ben-Akiva et al. [4], in the context of an integrated choice and latent variable
model, in order to capture systematic response biases in the respondents’answers to
attitudinal questions. As an illustration, these authors mention the possibility that
in a brand choice model respondents may exaggerate their response in reporting
the perceived quality of the chosen brand. Justification bias has also been stud-
ied in other contexts. For instance, in transportation literature, Polydoropoulou,
Gopinath, and Ben-Akiva [37] point out the possibility of justification bias when
the respondents’answers in stated preferences’experiments are influenced by their
actual choice. Also, in health and labor economics, Bound [7], Au, Crossley, and
Schellhorn [1], among others, analyze the relationship between self-reported health
evaluation and individual employment decision among different cohorts, finding that
respondents that do not work state a given health problem as a more serious limi-
tation than those that work. To the best of our knowledge our paper is the first to
incorporate justification bias in the CV framework.
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Our model is applied to a CV study regarding the preservation of the traditional
landscape of the Douro Region, a conservation area in the north of Portugal, which
has been classified by UNESCO as World Cultural Heritage since 2001, due to its
unique natural and human environments. The estimation results obtained support
the existence of four classes of respondents in the sample, which differ in terms of
the estimated WTP and protest attitudes.
We find evidence that the answer to the CV question influences the responses to
the attitudinal questions. In our case, this influence reflects budget constraint issues
and justification biases related to protest reasons, such as lack of trust in institutions
or fairness issues with respect to the distribution of the burden of preservation. In
fact, it may be the case that a non-protester tries to justify his negative CV response
by looking like a protestor when answering the attitudinal questions. In general, if
this justification bias is ignored in the model, respondents are not adequately classi-
fied, biasing the estimate of the economic value of the public good with implications
for policy purposes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, the theoretical
setup is developed. The data is described in Section 1.3, and the case study in Section
1.4. Section 1.5 presents and discusses the estimation results. Section 1.6 concludes
the paper. Pictures, tables, and figures are shown in the Appendix (1.A).
1.2. The Model
We develop a model that is able to describe the responses to the CV question and to
a set of attitudinal questions. The responses to these attitudinal questions contain
useful information about underlying unobserved attitudes with respect to different
elements in the survey setup such as budget constraint issues, or protesting related
to mistrust with respect to the institutional environment, or fairness issues, among
other reasons.
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We assume that the population can be divided into a finite number of latent
classes C that differ from each other in terms of their WTP and attitudes, which
in turn affect the CV responses and the responses to the attitudinal questions.
Therefore, although individual class membership is not directly observed, it can be
inferred from the available data.
Figure 1.3 shows the general representation of our model. It is based on the
integrated choice and latent variable model proposed by Ben-Akiva et al. [4], and
Cameron and Trivedi [16] (pg. 516).3 Observed variables appear in rectangles while
unobserved variables, such as WTP and the latent class variable, appear in ovals.
The dashed arrows from the latent class variable to the responses to the attitudinal
questions represent the measurement equations describing how the probability dis-
tributions of the responses to the attitudinal questions vary across classes. There-
fore, our approach assumes that the responses to the attitudinal questions are a
manifestation of underlying latent preferences and attitudes, as in Ben-Akiva et al.
[4], Provencher, Baerenklau, and Bishop [38] and Morey, Thacher and Breffl e [34].
The solid lines represent the CV model, where the answer to the CV question de-
pends on the bid value and the underlying WTP, which in turn depends on several
socio-economic and demographic variables within each class. WTP also depends
on underlying latent economic preferences that can be captured by a stochastic
component. Class membership may also depend on explanatory variables.
Finally, the model allows for justification bias, represented by the dotted arrows
that link the CV responses to the responses to the attitudinal questions. This
corresponds exactly to what was proposed by Ben-Akiva et al. [4] (pg. 439). In their
case the direction of causality goes from the actual choice to the stated responses,
as the latter are obtained after the actual choices are made. Since in our application
both the CV answer and the answers to the attitudinal questions were obtained
3Our approach is exactly the same as followed in the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)
approach where dependent variables in one equation appear as explanatory variables in another.
See Bollen [14], among others.
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during the interview, the direction of causality depends on the chronological order
in which they were presented. In particular, in our survey the attitudinal questions
always follow the CV question, implying that the direction of causality is as that
given by the dashed arrows that go from the CV answer to the answers to the
attitudinal questions in Figure 1.3.4
In the dichotomous choice CV question, respondents were asked whether they
would be willing to pay randomly assigned fixed amounts in order to preserve the
environmental good, or prefer not to pay, in which case environmental preservation
would be kept at a lower level (status-quo). To explain the responses to this question
we follow the random WTP approach as described in Bateman et al. [3], and Haab
and McConnell [13].
The WTP for an individual n belonging to a class c is written as follows:
WTPcn= V(Zn,ϑ
c
n;α
c) (1.1)
where Zn is a (k × 1) vector of explanatory variables that reflect individual-specific
socio-economic characteristics, ϑcn is a stochastic component capturing other unob-
servable individual heterogeneity, and αc is a vector of parameters specific to each
class c = 1, ..., C. Assuming a log-linear model, we have that, conditional on the
individual belonging to class c,
ln(WTPcn)= α
cZn+ϑ
c
n. (1.2)
In our application, we adopt the usual logit model and assume that ϑcn/σ
c follows
a standard logistic distribution where σc is a scale parameter affecting the variance
of the stochastic term in class c such that the cumulative distribution function of
z ≡ ϑcn/σc is given by F(z)=ez/(1 + ez).
4It can be easily observed from Fig. 1 that our model is recursive (no reciprocal or feed-back
loop relationships among the dependent variables), and, therefore, is identified. See Bollen [14].
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It follows that an individual responds to the CV question with “Pay”or “Not
Pay” if his WTP is “greater”or “not greater”than the proposed bid amount, re-
spectively. Defining un = 1 when the response is “Pay”, and un = 0 when it is “Not
Pay”, we have that:
un=
{ 1 if WTPcn > Bidn
0 otherwise
(1.3)
where Bidn is the randomly proposed bid amount. Therefore, the probability that
an individual n belonging to class c chooses to pay is given by:
P(un= 1|Zn,Bidn, c) = F(β
c
1Zn + β
c
2 ln(Bidn)) (1.4)
where βc1 = α
c/σc, and βc2 = −1/σc. The median WTP for an individual in class c
is given by Med(WTPcn) = exp[(β
c
1Zn)/(−βc2)].
The responses to the p attitudinal questions are denoted by a (p × 1) vector
In = (In1, ..., Inp)
′. These responses are categorically-ordered variables, given on a
Likert scale, taking values from 1 to T, as follows. For any given response j = 1, ..., p,
we have that
Inj =

T , if τ cj,T−1<I
∗
nj
T−1, if τ cj,T−2<I∗nj< τ cj,T−1
.
.
.
2, if τ cj,1<I
∗
nj< τ
c
j,2
1, if I∗nj< τ
c
j,1
(1.5)
where τ cj,k represents the threshold of switching from category (k − 1) to category
k when an individual belongs to class c, and I∗nj represents in this case the corre-
sponding answers to the attitudinal questions. We denote by τ c the vector of all
τ cj,k , j = 1, ..., p, k = 1, ..., T − 1.
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The answers to the attitudinal questions are assumed to depend on the class c,
the explanatory variables Zn, and the response to the CV question un, capturing
the justification bias, according to the measurement equation:
I∗n = Θ
cZn + Ψ
cun + ε
c
n (1.6)
where Θc and Ψc are (p × k) and (p × 1) vectors of parameters, respectively, for
class c, and εcn is a p × 1 vector of error terms that follows a logistic distribution
with a diagonal variance—covariance matrix Σcε, which may vary across classes.
In case the CV question has no impact on the answers to the attitudinal ques-
tions, that is, if there is no justification bias effect, then Ψc = 0 in equation (1.6) .
This hypothesis can be tested by checking the significance of the estimated vector
of parameters Ψc.5
From equations (1.5) and (1.6) we derive the probability of individual n respond-
ing In conditional on belonging to a particular class c, having characteristics Zn, and
having responded un to the CV question, which is denoted as g(In|Zn, un, c).
Finally, we also allow class membership to depend on explanatory variables:
P(cn = c|Zn) =
eδ
c+γcZn
C∑
c=1
eδ
c+γcZn
for c = 1, ...., C. (1.7)
As an identification condition we normalize the coeffi cients in (1.7) to zero in class
C. Equation (1.7) represents the probability that individual n belongs to class c
given his socio-economic characteristics. In addition, the conditional probability
that individual n belongs to class c can also be computed using Bayes’ rule. By
using (1.4) and (1.7) we obtain the probability that an individual n belongs to class
5In the questionnaire used in our empirical application, as it is common in related studies, the
attitudinal questions appear immediately after the CV question. If the order of the questions was
reversed, the nature of the justification bias would also have to be changed and the model modified
accordingly.
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c conditional on In,un and Zn, as follows
P(cn = c|In,un,Zn,Bidn;θ) =
P(cn = c|Zn)P(un = i|Zn,Bidn, c)g(In|Zn,un, c)
C∑
c=1
P(cn = c|Zn)P(un = i|Zn,Bidn, c)g(In|Zn,un, c)
(1.8)
The joint probability of the responses to the CV and to the attitudinal questions,
conditional only on the observable explanatory variables, is then given by
f(In, un|Zn,Bidn)=
C∑
c=1
∏
i=0,1
1(un=i)P(un = i|Zn,Bidn, c)g(In|Zn, un, c)P(cn = c|Zn) (1.9)
where 1(·) denotes the indicator function. The maximum likelihood estimator of the
parameters of this model are then obtained by
max
θ
L(θ) = max
θ
(
N∏
n=1
f(In, un|Zn,Bidn)
)
(1.10)
where θ = {(βc1,β
c
2,Θ
c,Ψc,Σcε, τ
c,δc,γc), c = 1, 2, ..., C} and N denotes the num-
ber of observations in the sample. The estimations were performed using the EM
algorithm (see Dempster, Laird, and Rubin [12]).6
1.3. Case Study
Our empirical application is based on a survey conducted in The Alto Douro Wine
Region, located to the east of the city of Oporto, in the north of Portugal. The
cultural landscape of the Alto Douro represents an outstanding example of hu-
mankind’s unique relationship with the natural environment. The “Demarcated
Douro Region”, defined and regulated since 1756, is one of the oldest of all the his-
6The code to implement the estimations is available from the authors upon request.
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toric winemaking regions in the world, producing a world commodity, Port Wine,
famous for its quality around the globe. The building of its landscape pattern by
the wine producers over the last three centuries characterized by the land partition
and cultural diversity was recognized as an exceptional testimony to a living cul-
tural tradition, and the Alto Douro Wine Region became part of UNESCO’s World
Heritage cultural landscape in 2001.
In the last three decades, there has been an enormous pressure to transform
the old vineyards into modern ones with the associated destruction of the typical
landscape, due to the need of increasing productivity.7 In this context, we investigate
the possibility of using an annual payment collected in addition to the annual income
tax to financially support the winegrowers in the region to prevent the destruction
of the landscape.8 However, the extent to which citizens trust public institutions
responsible for the implementation of this project or accept the vehicle of payment
are crucial issues in this context, and are not independent from the more general
economic conditions that have characterized Portugal in the last decade.
For the period 1996-2004, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi [23] constructed
aggregate measures of governance for 209 countries and territories, based on which
an index on Government Effectiveness was obtained. For the case of Portugal, this
index does not show an improvement in the country’s relative position. On the
contrary, from 2002 to 2004, it shows a negative trend.9 In the last decade, the
persistence of a large budget deficit has been responsible for a long period of slow
growth, below the EU average, making convergence more diffi cult. Moreover, there
is recent evidence that shows a great deal of persistence in indicators related to
development, such as income, growth rates, and income inequality, as well as with
respect to institutional indicators, which are also highly correlated with development
achievements. Given the performance of the Portuguese economy in recent years,
7See pictures in the Appendix.
8This is a quasi-public good, because it is possible to exclude people from its use, by charging
a price to use the resource or making the agent spend money or time to use the resource.
9See Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi [23], pg. 123 and pg. 130.
11
a reversal of the observed trend is not expected.10 Therefore, the circumstances
described should have an impact on the attitudes regarding the provision of public
goods, and, consequently, on how people answer CV surveys.
1.4. The Data
Information was collected in the summer of 2006 through face-to-face interviews of a
random sample of visitors to the Alto-Douro Wine region.11 Interviewers followed a
worded script to avoid leading effects. The questionnaire included a CV question to
measure the WTP for landscape preservation. The CV question format chosen was
the referendum dichotomous choice. Each respondent was asked a CV question for
an improvement in the level of preservation where the status-quo was the case of no
preservation, and the bids varied randomly among the respondents. The payment
mechanism that was proposed to respondents was an annual payment that would
be collected in addition to the annual income tax. The money raised would go to a
public institution that would compensate winegrowers for the incurred costs to keep
the traditional landscape.
Moreover, eleven attitudinal questions were also included in the survey imme-
diately following the CV question, and all respondents were asked to answer them
(see Appendix). The choice of these questions was based on similar studies, and
were previously tested in a pilot survey. The answers to those attitudinal questions
contain useful information about underlying unobserved attitudes with respect to
different elements in the survey setup, such as budget constraint issues (questions
B1-B4), protesting related to the lack of trust in institutions that are responsible
to implement the policy for preservation of the landscape (questions I1-I4), and,
finally, fairness issues associated with the distribution of the burden of preservation
10Recent evidence shows that income per capita or its growth, as well as the achievements in the
areas of health, education, infrastructure, etc., are highly correlated with measures of institutional
quality, ranging between 0.65 and 0.78, as mentioned in Gradstein [17].
11In order to account for the fact that the data is collected on-site would require an extension
of the econometric model which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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(questions F1-F3).
The sample used in this article consists of 706 observations. Table 1.1 provides
descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the estimations. In our survey, the
answers to the attitudinal questions were given in a five level Likert scale (from 1-
strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree). Since in the final sample some of the extreme
levels had very few or even no observations, we decided to merge some of the levels:
levels 4 and 5 in the Likert scale were merged in questions B2, B3 and F1, while in
the remaining questions (B1, B4, I1-I4, F2-F3) levels 1 and 2 were merged instead.
Table 2 presents the resulting frequency distribution of the answers to the attitudinal
questions.
1.5. Estimation Results
In this section, we present and discuss the estimation results for the model described
in Section 1.2. Although we have considered several explanatory variables, only
gender, and an indicator of previous visits to the site were statistically significant.
In order to select the number of classes we calculate six standard information criteria
(AIC, BIC, ABIC, AIC3, AICC, and CAIC). In Tables 1.3 and 1.4 we present the
results for the estimated models considering up to five classes, with and without
justification bias. The number of classes is identified by the lowest information-
criteria score. By inspection, we observe that for the model with justification the
results indicate four classes, while for the model without some criteria point to four
classes while others suggest five. However, the model with four classes allowing for
justification bias is always better than any other model without justification bias
according to all criteria.12
Estimation results for the models with four classes are shown in Table 1.5, where
Model 1 does not allow for justification bias, and Model 1J takes it into account.
This table is divided into four parts. The first corresponds to the CV equation (1.4),
12We also found that justification bias was significant independently of the number of classes.
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and the second to the membership equation (1.7). The third presents the results
for the justification bias effect given by the estimated vector of coeffi cients Ψc in
equation (1.6) for Model 1J. Finally, in the last part, the estimated median WTP,
the corresponding confidence intervals, and the estimated proportion of individuals
in each class are presented.
For both models, the four classes differ with respect to both the estimated coef-
ficients in the CV model, and the probability distributions of the responses to the
attitudinal questions. Moreover, in Model 1J, there are also differences in the way
the response to the CV question impacts the responses to the attitudinal questions,
that is, the four classes differ in terms of justification bias. Regarding the CV part
of the model, the estimated coeffi cients of ln(Bid) are significant in all classes in
both models, except for class 4, and have the expected negative sign. For class 1,
we find that those that have previously visited the site have a higher WTP.
We allow for the socio-economic characteristics to affect class membership. In
particular, visit is significant in class 2, while gender is significant in class 1 in Model
1J. In Model 1 only gender is significant in class 1. These results suggest that women
have a lower probability of belonging to class 1, while those that have previously
visited the site have a higher probability of belonging to class 2.
1.5.1. Justification Bias
In our case, we consider eleven attitudinal questions. Some of them address protest
reasons related to the lack of trust in institutions that are expected to implement
the policy (questions I1-I4), fairness issues related to the distribution of the bur-
den of preservation (questions F1-F3), while others capture concerns with budget
constraint issues (questions B1-B4). In Model 1J the answer to the CV question
is allowed to influence the response to the different attitudinal questions. Conse-
quently, the estimated conditional probabilities of the answers to these different
questions depend on whether the respondent answered Pay or Not Pay to the CV
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question. These estimated conditional probabilities are presented in Table 1.6 for
Model 1, and in Tables 1.7 for Not Pay, and Table 1.8 for Pay in Model 1J.
For each attitudinal question we can statistically test for the presence of the
justification bias effect, by checking if the coeffi cient of the answer to the CV question
is significant in the third part of Table 1.5. We observe that when the justification
bias effect is significant, the corresponding estimates are in general negative, meaning
that a positive answer to the CV question (“Pay”) has a negative impact on the
level of the Likert scale. Therefore, when a respondent answers negatively to the
CV question, that person tries to justify that response by inflating his responses to
those questions. For instance, it may be the case that a non-protester does not wish
to look guilty in the eyes of other people for not affording to pay or not valuing
the environment highly enough, and, subsequently, tries to justify his negative CV
response by looking like a protestor when answering the attitudinal questions. As a
consequence, in each class, we may conclude that the probability distribution of the
responses to the attitudinal questions is shifted to the right in the case of “Not Pay”
when compared to “Pay”, as can be observed in Tables 5B and 5C. On the other
hand, in each class, for those questions such that the estimates of the coeffi cients
of the answers to the CV question are not significant, we may conclude that all the
class members express a similar view with respect to those issues, regardless of their
response to the CV question.
In order to better understand the differences between the four classes in Model
1J, we summarize the main findings in Table 1.9. This table is divided into three
parts. In the first part we identify rational behavior by checking whether ln(Bid)
is significant and whether the answer to the CV question influences the answers to
the questions related to budget constraint issues (questions B1-B4). In the follow-
ing part, we check for the presence of justification bias related to protest reasons,
in particular, the lack of trust in institutions (questions I1-I4), and fairness issues
(questions F1-F3). Finally, we characterize the classes according to the way respon-
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dents answered to all the eleven questions. In particular, the results in Tables 1.7
and 1.8 are summarized by identifying for each group of questions the response level
in the Likert scale with the highest probability.
In what concerns rational behavior, we observe that ln (Bid) is significant in
all classes, except for class 4. Moreover, in classes 1 and 3 all the answers to the
four questions associated with budget constraint issues are significantly affected
by the answer to the CV question. From the third part of Table 4, the negative
sign of the corresponding coeffi cients suggests that those that refused to pay the
bid feel more strongly about budget constraint issues, as expected, suggesting that
respondents in those three classes behave rationally from an economic perspective,
that is, consistent with constrained utility maximization.
Regarding class 4, the results suggest that the respondents in this class do not
relate the bid to the economic value of the good as ln(Bid) was found not significant,
and yet they may value the good. In a different context, a class with similar charac-
teristics was found in Herriges, Kling, Liu and Tobias [19], labelled “inconsequential
group” (“if respondents do not believe the result of the survey might potentially
influence an outcome they care about”), where the “Yes” response rate does not
decrease with the bid values.13
In the case of justification bias related to protest reasons we observe that while
in the case of institutions, two questions out of four are significant in class 3, and
three out of four in class 4, none is significant in classes 1 and 2. Therefore, this
suggests that in class 3 respondents have used institutions as an argument to justify
their answer to the CV question. In contrast, in what concerns fairness issues, one
question out of three is significant in all classes. Interestingly enough, fairness issues
are present across all classes, suggesting that for the sampled population this is a
13As mentioned before, a type of protest responses are invalid highs, which in the context of di-
chotomous choice CV correspond to invalid yes. In our model this would correspond to a class with
a high median WTP and with strong protest attitudes, that is, characterized by high probabilities
of answering levels 4 or 5 in the Likert scale for the responses to the attitudinal questions capturing
protest reasons. However, we do not find a class with similar characteristics in our estimated model
with justification bias. We thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
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rather sensitive issue.
From the last part of Table 1.9, and, in what concerns the questions related to
institutions, we may conclude that among those who “Pay”the majority of respon-
dents is indifferent in class 1, agrees in class 2, as well as in class 3, and is mostly
indifferent in class 4. For those who did not Pay, while in class 1 a large number
of indifferents is also observed, in class 2 respondents basically agree, and in class 3
the majority strongly agrees. In class 4 agreement is observed. So, more clear state-
ments are observed as we move from class 1 to class 3. In class 3 we also observe
that despite they value the good and state that preservation is their problem, the
majority of respondents strongly agrees that money will be used for other purposes,
that the payment will not insure the preservation of the landscape and that they
already pay enough taxes for it. In contrast, in class 1 they are indifferent with
respect to the statement that the payment will not insure the preservation of the
landscape, and agree that they already pay enough taxes for this preservation. Ac-
cording to these results, we may classify class 1 respondents as low protestors, class
2 respondents as medium protestors and class 3 respondents as high protestors.
With respect to fairness, we find a similar pattern to the above one for those
who pay, despite that we observe a smaller number of indifferents, and in class 3
respondents state more strongly their agreement. For those that do not pay, we
observe that there are no respondents stating indifference. Hence, in classes 1 and
2 most of the respondents agree, while in class 3 strongly agree. In class 4, those
that pay present a very disperse pattern while the majority that does not pay agrees.
Thus, in classes 1, 2, and 3, we find that respondents that do not pay have in general
a clearer position with respect to fairness issues, when compared to protest reasons
concerning institutions. For instance, indifference is not present. As mentioned
above, fairness is a rather sensitive issue for all the respondents.
When comparing Model 1 to 1J, we observe that class 1 in both models represents
respondents that are mostly indifferent with respect to different protest issues. For
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classes 1 and 2 the estimated conditional probabilities in Model 1 are in between
those in Model 1J for “Not Pay” and “Pay”. Also, the pattern found in class
4 in Model 1 matches that found in class 4 for “Pay” in Model 1J, and class 3
in Model 1 matches class 3 for “Not Pay” in Model 1J. This is the result of the
rearrangement of respondents among classes, when taking account justification bias,
as some respondents that were not willing to pay moved into class 4, while some
others that were willing to pay moved into class 3 in Model 1J. Ultimately, the
number of respondents in classes 2 and 4 have increased, and decreased in the
others.
For policy purposes, we may use the estimated median WTP for class 1 in the
model with justification bias (48.1 euros) as an estimate of the true economic value,
as the results suggest that individuals in this class behave rationally and are mostly
indifferent with respect to the majority of the attitudinal questions related to the
different protest reasons. This estimated value is substantially higher than those
obtained for the other classes (6.53 euros in class 2, and 10.3 euros in class 3),
as well as the estimated value from the standard logit model (approximately 12.8
euros).14 Mostly important, we observe that by accounting for the justification bias
the obtained median WTP estimates are also different. In particular, median WTP
for class 1 in Model 1 is 12 euros lower than that obtained for the same class in Model
1J. Notice also that this difference in WTP is significant, since the corresponding
confidence intervals do not overlap. Therefore, the relevance of behavioral aspects,
as captured by justification bias, should not be ignored.
1.6. Conclusion
In this article, we develop a latent class model for estimating WTP for public goods
using simultaneously CV and attitudinal data capturing attitudes related to different
14This corresponds to the estimation of equation (1.4) in Section 1.2 when including gender,
visits, employment condition, and age.
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elements in the survey setup, such as budget constraint issues, protesting related to
the lack of trust in public institutions or fairness issues. Moreover, we allow for the
possibility of a justification bias, that is, the potential impact of the response to the
CV question on the answers to the attitudinal questions. In fact, justification bias
allows for a better characterization of the pattern of responses within each class,
compared to the case without justification bias, by distinguishing those that pay
from those that do not pay.
Based on a CV study conducted in The Alto Douro Wine Region, located in the
north of Portugal, four classes of respondents are identified. We show that in our
case omitting this justification bias would underestimate the true economic value
for preserving the good as measured by the value of the estimated median WTP in
class 1, that is, the one in which most respondents indicate indifference with respect
to protest attitudes. Therefore, for policy purposes, psychological factors should not
be disregarded in CV estimation.
Our methodology is flexible enough, and can be applied to other contexts in-
volving different behavioral aspects or attitudes. Moreover, it can be extended to
other stated preference elicitation formats, such as double-bounded CV and choice
experiments. This is left for further research.
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1.A. Appendix
1.A.1. Attitudinal Questions
- Budget Constraint Issues (B1—B4):
B1. The values are too high
B2. I can’t afford to pay anything right now
B3. The landscape preservation is not my problem
B4. I would rather pay more important things
- Institutions (I1—I4):
I1. The landscape should be preserved with the current taxes
I2. I think money will be used for other purposes
I3. This payment will not insure the preservation of the landscape
I4. I already pay enough taxes for this preservation
- Fairness Issues (F1—F3):
F1. The residents of the region should pay for this preservation
F2. The local authorities and tourist operators should pay for this preservation
F3. It is not fair to ask me to pay
See Appendix Tables 1.1-1.9. See Appendix Figure 1.3.
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1.A.2. Tables
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max Description
CV answer 0.32 0.47 0 1 Answer to the CV question (1=Pay, 0=Not Pay)
Bid 46.7 29.7 10 100 Bid for the CV question in Euros
Age 45.3 13.7 18 85 The age of the respondent
Emp 0.78 0.41 0 1 Employment Condition (1=Employed, 0=otherwise)
Visit 0.59 0.49 0 1 (1=If respondent has visited this place before, 0=otherwise)
Gender 0.47 0.25 0 1 (1=If respondent is a female, 0= respondent is a male)
Table 1.2: Distribution of Answers to the Attitudinal Questions (%)
1 2 3 4
B1a 27.2 17.6 37.1 18.1
B2b 8.9 32.6 32.2 26.3
B3b 25.8 54.4 7.1 12.7
B4a 27.9 32 32.7 7.4
I1a 4.2 7.1 60.9 27.8
I2a 11.9 28.9 41.5 17.7
I3a 13 31.6 38.2 17.1
I4a 6.1 12.3 54.4 27.2
F1b 21.1 50.8 13.7 14.3
F2a 18.4 13.7 48.6 19.3
F3a 16.9 15.6 52.1 15.4
Attitudinal 
Questions
Adjusted Scale
Notes:
a. Levels 1 and 2 in a Likert scale are measured in a level 1 in the table
b. Levels 4 and 5 in a Likert scale are measured in a level 4 in the table
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Table 1.3: Model Selection Criteria for Model without Justification Bias
2 classes 3 classes 4 classes 5 classes
LL ‐9239 ‐8939 ‐8786 ‐8734
AIC 18628 18107 17865 17820
BIC 18970 18627 18531 18623
ABIC 18732 18265 18067 18064
AIC3 18703 18220 18010 17996
AICC 18646 18151 17941 17938
CAIC 18767 18317 18134 18145
# of parameters 75 114 146 176
Number of Classes
Criteria
Table 1.4: Model Selection Criteria for Model with Justification Bias
2 classes 3 classes 4 classes 5 classes
LL ‐9023 ‐8840 ‐8653 ‐8605
AIC 18240 17968 17679 17705
BIC 18682 18625 18527 18831
ABIC 18347 18168 17936 18047
AIC3 18337 18112 17864 17951
AICC 18271 18042 17813 17972
CAIC 18419 18234 18022 18161
# of parameters 97 144 186 247
Number of Classes
Criteria
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Table 1.6: Estimated Conditional Probabilities of Answers to the Attitudinal Ques-
tions in Model 1 (%)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
B1a 18 43 34 4 11 13 61 15 37 5 20 39 48 11 28 14
B2b 0 13 74 13 0 21 23 56 25 48 8 19 12 52 28 8
B3b 26 66 8 0 3 57 15 25 37 44 2 17 45 50 1 4
B4a 20 59 21 0 11 25 60 5 41 11 26 22 46 39 15 1
I1a 3 14 79 3 7 3 78 12 3 0 23 74 4 14 62 21
I2a 10 68 22 0 7 15 69 9 4 11 33 51 31 26 35 8
I3a 11 72 17 0 11 19 65 5 3 9 31 58 31 33 32 4
I4a 1 21 74 4 1 4 82 13 1 2 18 79 25 27 38 10
F1b 3 62 29 6 2 53 15 31 48 39 5 8 35 51 6 8
F2a 12 20 65 2 15 15 63 7 23 4 24 48 25 16 39 20
F3a 5 34 61 0 9 5 75 10 2 3 48 47 59 25 14 2
Class 4Attitudinal 
Questions
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Notes:
a. Levels 1 and 2 in a Likert scale are measured in a level 1 in the table
b. Levels 4 and 5 in a Likert scale are measured in a level 4 in the table
Table 1.7: Estimated Conditional Probabilities of Answers to the Attitudinal Ques-
tions in Model 1J, Not Pay (%)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
B1a 3 31 54 11 12 11 65 13 31 3 22 44 32 13 27 27
B2b 0 3 81 16 0 22 20 58 18 51 4 27 15 51 31 4
B3b 14 74 12 0 3 54 15 27 25 47 3 26 51 47 1 1
B4a 0 56 44 0 17 24 56 3 37 9 29 26 31 36 23 10
I1a 2 14 80 3 7 4 79 11 0 0 11 89 4 7 60 29
I2a 7 70 23 0 8 17 66 8 3 7 29 60 15 22 42 22
I3a 9 69 23 0 10 21 63 5 1 2 20 77 12 30 45 13
I4a 1 23 74 2 2 5 78 15 0 0 6 94 6 14 56 24
F1b 4 65 27 4 1 54 17 28 49 39 5 8 38 50 5 7
F2a 13 19 67 2 15 16 63 6 27 4 21 48 20 12 41 27
F3a 7 45 48 0 6 7 76 11 4 2 41 53 13 20 48 19
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4Attitudinal 
Questions
Notes:
a. Levels 1 and 2 in a Likert scale are measured in a level 1 in the table
b. Levels 4 and 5 in a Likert scale are measured in a level 4 in the table
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Table 1.8: Estimated Conditional Probabilities of Answers to the Attitudinal Ques-
tions in Model 1J, Pay (%)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
B1a 28 57 14 1 36 19 42 3 69 3 15 14 51 14 21 15
B2b 0 16 81 3 0 23 21 56 55 38 1 6 14 50 32 4
B3b 37 60 4 0 6 66 11 16 60 32 1 7 41 56 2 2
B4a 24 76 0 0 17 24 56 3 83 5 9 4 49 32 14 5
I1a 4 19 75 2 7 4 78 10 0 0 21 79 6 11 63 20
I2a 11 74 15 0 10 20 64 7 8 18 41 34 39 30 24 7
I3a 12 71 17 0 20 31 47 2 5 13 51 32 34 39 23 4
I4a 1 18 78 3 4 12 77 6 0 0 11 89 30 33 32 4
F1b 3 60 31 6 1 48 18 33 64 29 3 4 38 49 5 8
F2a 14 20 65 1 20 19 57 4 13 3 15 70 17 11 41 31
F3a 2 22 76 0 35 21 42 1 14 5 59 22 63 22 13 2
Class 4Attitudinal 
Questions
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Notes:
a. Levels 1 and 2 in a Likert scale are measured in a level 1 in the table
b. Levels 4 and 5 in a Likert scale are measured in a level 4 in the table
Table 1.9: Summary of Estimation Results for Model 1J
Classes 1 2 3 4
Rational Behavior:
        ‐      Ln(Bid)‐significant Yes Yes Yes No
        ‐      # of significant estimated Ψ´s related 
to budget constraint issues (B1‐B4)
4 1 (B1) 4 1 (B4)
# of significant estimated Ψ´s related to :
‐          Institutions (I1‐I4) 0 0 2 (I2, I3) 3 (I2, I3, I4)
‐          Fairness (F1‐F3) 1 (F3) 1 (F3) 1 (F2) 1 (F3)
Mode:
‐ Budget Constraint (B1‐B4):
‐    Pay Indifferent Agree Strongly Disagree
Indifferent & 
Strongly Agree
‐    Not‐Pay Agree & Indifferent
Agree & Strongly 
Agree
Disagree & Strongly 
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
‐ Institutions (I1‐I4):
‐    Pay Indifferent Agree Agree Indifferent
‐    Not‐Pay Indifferent Agree Strongly Agree Agree
‐ Fairness (F1‐F3)
‐    Pay Agree Agree Strongly Agree Agree+
‐    Not‐Pay Agree* Agree* Strongly Agree* Agree*
Notes:
*+ In addition, respondents always disagree when answering F1
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1.A.3. Figures
Figure 1.1:Traditional Landscape of Alto Douto
 
Figure 1.2:The New Vineyards
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Figure 1.3:General Representation of the Joint CV and Latent Class ModelsFigure 1: General Representation of the Joint CV and Latent Class Models 
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Chapter 2
Protest Attitudes and Stated Preferences: Evidence
on Scale Usage Heterogeneity
coauthored with M. A. Cunha-e-Sá, and L. C. Nunes
Abstract
We contribute to the stated preference literature by addressing scale usage het-
erogeneity regarding how individuals answer attitudinal questions capturing lack of
trust in institutions and fairness issues. Using a latent class model, we conduct a
contingent valuation study to elicit the willingness-to-pay to preserve a recreational
site. We find evidence that respondents within the same class, that is, with simi-
lar preferences and attitudes, interpret the Likert scale differently when answering
the attitudinal questions. We identify different patterns of scale usage heterogeneity
within and across classes and associate them with individual characteristics. Our ap-
proach contributes to a better understanding of individual behavior in the presence
of protest attitudes.
Keywords: Scale usage heterogeneity; Likert scale; protest attitudes; contingent
valuation; latent class model.
JEL Classification Numbers: C35, Q51
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2.1. Introduction
Survey based techniques, such as Contingent Valuation (CV) and Choice Modelling,
have been widely used in many research fields, namely, economics, sociology, and
political science, to elicit the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for non-market goods. These
techniques rely on the neoclassical theory of preferences assuming that individuals
behave rationally. However, elicited preferences are also affected by other individual
factors.1 Different individuals may have different WTPs, not only because they differ
in terms of preferences, but also in their beliefs or attitudes. A typical situation is
when respondents state zero values to open-ended questions or refuse to accept
any CV bids, even though they may value the good in question.2 This behavior
is frequently attributed to protest attitudes associated with the lack of trust in
institutions, fairness issues, strategic acting, or respondents’disagreement with some
part of the survey.3 As a result, the elicited WTP obtained from the use of standard
SP techniques may not represent the “true”one if protest attitudes are ignored.
Latent Class Models (LCM) have been used in the literature to identify distinct
groups of people with different preferences, beliefs, or attitudes, where the individual
class membership is unknown or latent. In this context, recent valuation studies
include a set of follow-up questions in their surveys, representing an important source
of additional information regarding individual attitudes. In general, attitudinal
questions involve a discrete rating scale, such as the Likert scale. In particular, the
5-point Likert scale (from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) is often used.
However, even individuals with similar preferences and attitudes may interpret and
use the same scale ratings (categories) differently. For instance, some people answer
only in the middle of the scale, while others may use the lower or upper end on the
1For instance, Brown and Taylor [8] discuss gender differences regarding hypothetical bias.
Another example is Botzen and van der Bergh [6] on individual risk attitudes related to climate
change. For a general discussion see Bateman et al.[2].
2See Carson and Groves [10], Mitchell and Carson [19], among others.
3See Mitchell and Carson [19], Blamey [5], Meyerhoff and Liebe [17] and [18], Polomé [20],
among others.
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Likert scale. This phenomenon is known as scale usage heterogeneity and has been
discussed in the context of consumer behavior literature by Rossi et al. [22], Wong
et al. [23], and Jong et al. [15], among others.
This paper contributes to the CV literature by addressing scale use heterogeneity
in the context of latent class analysis. We identify the factors that may explain
why respondents use the scale differently, namely, by associating their answers with
socioeconomic and preference variables.
The results are discussed in the context of a CV study regarding the preservation
of a recreation site in the north of Portugal. After the standard CV question in
the questionnaire, a set of attitudinal questions related to the budget issues and
protest attitudes associated with the lack of trust in institutions and fairness issues
is included.
The estimation results suggest three classes that differ with respect to the de-
gree of protest attitudes as well as to the willingness-to-pay. We find evidence of the
presence of scale usage heterogeneity, varying across classes, which is not related to
WTP. Scale usage heterogeneity can also be associated with individual characteris-
tics. For instance, respondents that visited the site more than once and belong to
the classes that value the good use the upper end of the scale when answering the
institutional attitudinal questions. Therefore, independently of being protestors or
not, those that have visited the site more than once are more concerned with its
preservation, and, hence, with the quality of the institutions that are responsible
for it. Besides, among those that have higher protest attitudes, respondents that
are employed and have visited the site more than once state the higher value when
responding to institutional questions. Hence, these respondents are more critical
with respect to the quality of institutions, suggesting that misuse of fiscal revenue
is an especially sensitive issue for employed individuals. Finally, we find evidence
of justification bias, that is, the response to the CV question affects the way people
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answer attitudinal questions.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the
theoretical methodology. Section 2.3 describes the data. Then, Section 2.4 presents
and discusses the estimation results, while Section 2.5 concludes the paper. Tables
and Figures are presented in the Appendix.
2.2. The Model
In this section, we describe the proposed statistical methodology to estimate the
underlying WTP for non-market-goods when using CV and attitudinal data. Our
model is based on the LCM as described in McLachlan and Peel [16]. Individuals
are assumed to belong to one of several classes that differ in terms of the underlying
WTP as well as unobserved behavioral, psychological, or attitudinal aspects. Even
though individual class membership is not directly observed by the researcher, it
can be inferred from the responses to the attitudinal and CV questions.
An important feature of our model is that it takes into account possible indi-
vidual scale usage heterogeneity in the responses to the attitudinal questions. This
unobservable heterogeneity is captured by a latent variable, designated as subjec-
tive scaling variable.5 As shown below, our model also allows to test for testing
heterogeneity associated or not with the underlying WTP.
The general representation of the model is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Rectangles
represent observed variables and ellipses represent unobserved variables, such as
WTP, latent class, and subjective scaling. This approach is similar to that of Ben-
Akiva et al. [3], Provencher et al. [21], Cunha-e-Sá et al. [11]. The only difference is
that in this model we introduce the subjective scaling variable affecting the responses
to the CV and the attitudinal questions. The solid lines represent the CV model,
4This bias is widely discussed in different economic fields, such as health, labor, transportation,
and environment. See Au et al. [1], Bound [7], Ben-Akiva et al. [3], Cunha-e-Sá et al. [11], among
others.
5See Bollen [14] for a discussion on latent variable models.
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where the CV question depends on the bid and underlying WTP. The subjective
scaling is allowed to be the class specific. This relationship is presented by the
dotted line from the latent class variable to the scaling variable. In addition, we
explore the correlation between explanatory variables and subjective scaling, which
is highlighted by the dashed-dotted arrows from the explanatory variables to the
subjective scaling variable. Following Cunha-e-Sá et al. [11], the dashed arrows
from the CV response to the attitudinal questions represent justification bias.
In order to estimate the willingness-to-pay, we follow the randomWTP approach
as described in Bateman et al. [2], and Haab and McConnell [13]. The WTP for an
individual n in class c can be written as follows:
WTPcn= V(Zn,S
∗
n,ϑ
c
n;α
c) (2.1)
where Zn is a k × 1 vector of explanatory variables that reflects individual-specific
socioeconomic characteristics, S∗n is the subjective scaling variable, ϑ
c
n is a stochastic
component capturing other unobservable individual heterogeneity, and αc vectors
of parameters for each class c = 1, ..., C. Assuming a log-linear model we have that,
conditional on an individual n belonging to class c , ln(WTPcn) can be written as
follows:
ln(WTPcn)= α
c
1Zn+α
c
2S
∗
n+ϑ
c
n (2.2)
In our application we adopt the usual logit model and assume that ϑcn/σ
c follows
a logistic distribution where σc is a scale parameter affecting the variance of the
stochastic term in class c such that the cumulative distribution function of z ≡ ϑcn/σc
is given by F(z)=ez/(1 + ez).
In our application the dichotomous choice referendum was chosen as the format
of the CV question. It follows that an individual responds to the CV question with
“Pay”or “Not Pay”if his WTP is “larger”or “not larger”than the proposed bid
amount, respectively. Defining un = 1 when the response is “Pay”, and un = 0
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when it is “Not Pay”, we have that:
un=
{
1 if WTPcn > Bidn
0 otherwise
(2.3)
where Bidn is the randomly proposed bid amount. Thus, the probability that an
individual n belonging to class c chooses to pay is given by:
Pu(un= 1|Zn,S
∗
n,Bidn, c) = F(β
c
1Zn + β
c
2S
∗
n + β
c
3 ln(Bidn)) (2.4)
where βc1 = α
c
1/σ
c, βc2 = α
c
2/σ
c and βc3 = −1/σc. The median WTP in class c is
given by Med(WTPcn) = exp
{
−β
c
1Zn + β
c
2S
∗
n
βc3
}
.
The responses to the attitudinal questions are categorically ordered and are
measured in a Likert scale taking values from 1 to T . These responses are denoted
by a (p × 1) vector In = (In1,...,InJ)
′
. Each response j of an individual n can be
represented as follows:
Inj =

Tj if τ
c
j,Tj−1<I
∗
nj
Tj−1 if τ cj,Tj−2<I
∗
nj< τ
c
j,Tj−1
.
.
.
2 if τ cj,1<I
∗
nj< τ
c
j,2
1 if I∗nj< τ
c
j,1
(2.5)
where τ cj,k represents the threshold of switching from category k − 1 to category k
when an individual belongs to class c, and I∗nj represents the corresponding latent
unobserved response. We denote by τ the vector of all τ cj,k, j = 1, ..., p, k = 1, ..., T−
1.
The responses to the attitudinal questions are denoted by a p× 1 vector I∗n, and
are assumed to depend on the class c, the response to the CV, un, and the subjective
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scaling S∗n according to:
I∗n= Θ
c + Ψcun+Λ
cS∗n + ε
c
n (2.6)
where Θc and Ψc are p× 1 vectors of parameters and Λc is a p×m vector of factor
loadings for class c, respectively, and εcn is a p×1 vector of measurement errors that
follow a distribution D(0,Σcε). In our application we use a logistic distribution.
If all the elements of the vector of factor loadings Λc are equal to zero in a given
class c, then the model assumes that every individual in that class interprets the
Likert scale similarly when responding to all the attitudinal questions. On the other
hand, if some of the elements of Λc are statistically different from zero, it means that
the individuals in that class interpret the Likert scale differently and, as a result, may
provide different responses. Moreover, this model allows us to test if this scale usage
heterogeneity in a given class is associated or not with different WTPs by checking
the significance of βc2 in equation (2.4). If β
c
2 turns out not to be significant, it
means that although the individuals in class c may provide different responses to
some of the attitudinal questions, they may still be considered as homogeneous in
terms of the underlying WTP distribution.
From equations (2.5) and (2.6) we derive the probability of individual n answering
In conditional on belonging to a particular class c, having responded un, and the
subjective scaling S∗n, which is denoted as gI(In|un,S∗n, c). The observed explanatory
variables, Zn, may also affect the subjective scaling S∗n. Thus, the structural equation
for this relationship is described by
S∗n= Φ
cZn+ξ
c
n (2.7)
where Φc is a m× l coeffi cient matrix, and ξcn ∼ D(0,Σcξ) is a m× 1 vector of i.i.d.
random variables for each class c.
The combination of equations (2.4) and (2.7) gives the probability that an indi-
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vidual n belongs to class c conditional on responses to In,un, explanatory variables
Zn, and subjective scaling S∗n is:
P(cn = c|In,un,Zn,S
∗
n,Bidn;θ) =
P(cn = c)P(un = i|Zn,S∗n,Bidn, c)gI(In|un,S∗n, c)
C∑
c=1
P(cn = c)×P(un = i|Zn,S∗n,Bidn, c)gI(In|,un,S∗n, c)
(2.8)
The joint probability of the responses to the CV and attitudinal questions, con-
ditional on the exogenous explanatory variables, Zn and Bidn is given by
f(In,un|Zn,Bidn,θ) =
C∑
c=1
∫
S∗
∏
i=1,2
1(un= i)Pu(un= i|Zn,S
∗
n;β
c,σc)× (2.9)
×P(cn = c)gI(In |un,S∗n;σc,Λc,Σcε)gS∗(S∗n |Φc,Ψc,Σcξ)dS∗n
where 1(.) is the indicator function, Pu is the probability that an individual n
pays (un= 1) or does not pay (un= 0), given by (2.4), gI is the probability density
function of the observed responses to attitudinal questions obtained by equations
(2.5) and (2.6) , gS∗ is the probability density function of the subjective scaling
derived from equation (2.7), and
θ =
{
(βc1,β
c
2,β
c
3,Λ
c,Φc,Ψc,Σcε,Σε,Σξ, τ
c,σc, δc,γc), c = 1, 2, ..., C
}
(2.10)
is a vector of the parameters of the model. The integration takes place over the
subjective scaling S∗.
Finally, the maximum likelihood estimator can be obtained by
max
θ
L(θ) = max
θ
(
N∏
n=1
f(In,un|Zn,Bidn,θ)
)
(2.11)
40
where N denotes the number of individuals in the sample.
2.3. Case Study
The data for the empirical application were collected in the summer of 2006, in the
Alto Douro Wine Region located in the north of Portugal, to the east of the city
of Oporto, in the north of Portugal. The Alto Douro Wine Region became part of
UNESCO’sWorld Heritage cultural landscape in 2001. This landscape is comparable
to the rice-growing terraces of Banaue in the Philippines. This site is one of the
oldest historical winemaking regions in the world, where the famous Port Wine is
produced. However, in the last three decades the old vineyards have undergone
transformation in order to decrease costs and increase production effi ciency. This
transformation causes the destruction of the original landscape.
To preserve the unique landscape of this region, which is an important recreation
site, the winegrowers have to be compensated for the incurred cost. To evaluate the
benefits from the preservation of the traditional attributes of the vineyard landscape
in the Douro Valley, an on-site face-to-face survey of a random sample of visitors to
the site was conducted. The money raised would go to a public institution that would
compensate winegrowers for the incurred costs of keeping the traditional landscape.
The payment mechanism that was proposed to respondents was an annual payment
that would be collected in addition to the annual income tax.
In order to evaluate the willingness-to-pay for the landscape preservation, the
questionnaire included a CV question in the form of referendum dichotomous choice.
Each respondent was asked a CV question about an improvement in the level of
preservation. The status-quo is the case of no preservation, and the bids vary among
the respondents. After the CV question the respondents were asked several attitu-
dinal questions related to the budget constraint (B1-B4) associated with rational
behavior, the quality of institutions (I1-I4), and fairness issues (F1-F3), represent-
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ing protesting behavior (see Appendix for details). All attitudinal questions were
measured on a 5-point Likert scale (from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5)).
As for some categories there were few responses, they were merged with the adjacent
ones.
The sample used in this paper has 706 observations. Table 2.1 provides de-
scriptive statistics for all the variables used in the estimations. In Table 2.2, the
distribution of responses to the attitudinal questions with merged categories is pre-
sented. As can be seen from this table, many respondents answered 3 and 4 on a
Likert scale, meaning that they agreed or strongly agreed with the corresponding
statements.
2.4. Estimation Results
In order to identify the optimal number of classes for the model, we use five infor-
mation criteria, namely AIC, BIC, ABIC, AICC, and CAIC. As seen in Table 2.3,
the majority are in favor of the model with three classes. The results for this model
are shown in Table 2.4. The first section of Table 2.4 corresponds to equation (2.6)
where the factor loadings are presented. The next section corresponds to equation
(2.7) where the relationship between the subjective scaling and socioeconomic and
preference variables is explored. In the third section we present the results for the
CV equation (2.4),and in the fourth the justification bias is presented. Finally, the
last section shows the median WTP, the confidence interval for WTP, the number
of parameters, probability of belonging to each class, and entropy.
We start by characterizing each class based on the corresponding estimated pa-
rameters. The estimation results of the CV equation (2.4) are presented in the third
section of Table 2.4. The significant estimates of ln(Bid) in classes 1 and 2 suggest
that individuals in these classes value the good. We note that the difference found in
the estimated WTPs is not negligible, and can be attributed to the different protest
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attitudes of individuals in those classes. In contrast to the other two classes, in class
3 ln(Bid) is not significant, suggesting that individuals in this class do not value the
good.
Following Cunha-e-Sá et al. [11], we allow individuals to justify the response to
the CV question when responding to the set of attitudinal questions. This behavior
is known as justification bias. The estimated coeffi cients for the budget constraint
issues and justification biases with respect to the lack of trust in institutions and
fairness issues are presented in the second section of Table 2.4. The estimates on
institutional (I2-I4) issues are significant in class 1. When individuals refuse to pay
because the bid is above their WTP it may be the case that they try to justify their
negative CV response by looking like a protestor. Also, the individuals in classes 1
and 2 use the budget constraint attitudinal questions to justify the “Not Pay”CV
answer by inflating the responses to those questions, representing rational behavior.
Therefore, we may conclude that justification biases with respect to institutions and
fairness issues are a sensitive issue for those individuals.
The presence of justification implies that the probability distributions of the
responses to some of the attitudinal questions are shifted to the right for the “Pay”
answers compared to the “Not Pay” ones, as can be observed when comparing
the results in Tables 2.5 to 2.6, respectively. In both tables we observe that the
distributions of the responses to questions I1-I4 and F1-F3 for class 2 are shifted to
the right relative to those in class 1, underlscoring the importance of the lack of trust
in institutions and fairness issues for respondents in class 2. Therefore, we conclude
that class 1 represents individuals with low protest attitudes (non-protestors), while
class 2 represents those with high protest attitudes (protestors).
Regarding rational behavior captured by the responses to the questions (B1-B4)
in Table 5A, we find that the modes of the distributions in classes 1 and 2 are
mostly disagree and strongly disagree (B1, B3, and B4), respectively. Comparing
these classes with respect to the institutional and fairness issues for ”Pay”responses,
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we find that the mode in class 1 is either indifferent (I2 and I3) or agree (I1 and I4),
while in class 2 the mode is either agree (I2 and I3) or strongly agree (I1 and I4).
Concerning the fairness issues, in class 1, the mode ranges from disagree to agree,
while in class 2 the mode is between strongly disagree and strongly agree (F1, F3,
and F2, respectively).
Based on these results, we conclude that individuals in class 1 have lower protest
attitudes compared to individuals in class 2. Therefore, the calculated median WTP
(34.12 Euros) in class 1 is expected to be closer to the “true” one. Nevertheless,
the individuals in class 2 that have a higher protest attitude are also willing to
pay some positive amount even though the estimated median WTP (8.29 Euros) is
substantially lower than in class 1.
2.4.1. Scale Usage Heterogeneity
We now discuss the estimation results regarding scale usage heterogeity. We first
test for its presence, second, explore its causes, and third examine how the subjec-
tive scaling and socioeconomic and preferences variables affect the responses to the
attitudinal questions.
Since the estimated coeffi cients of the subjective scaling variable are significant
(first section of Table 2.4), the presence of scale usage heterogeneity among respon-
dents within each class is confirmed. For instance, in class 1, the factor loadings
are significant only for the institutional issues (I2-I4), while in classes 2 and 3 the
factor loadings are significant for budget constraint, institutional, and fairness issues
(B2, I1-I4, and F3 in class 2 and B1, B3, and I4 in class 3). Given these results,
we may conclude that the subjective scaling of individuals affects the responses to
some attitudinal questions, and varies across classes.
Moreover, we test whether the individual subjective scaling can be directly as-
sociated with the economic valuation of the good, in particular, if it is significant in
the CV question (third section of Table 2.4). As observed, the estimated coeffi cients
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of this variable are not statistically significant in all classes. This means that the es-
timated WTP is representative of all individuals within each class, and is unrelated
to the individual subjective scaling.
As stated by Rossi et al. [22], scale usage heterogeneity is a well documented
phenomenon. However, its causes are not well understood. In our model we explore
the association between the subjective scaling and individual characteristics, such
as gender, employment status, and the previous visits to the site. The results are
shown in the second section of Table 2.4. While the estimated coeffi cients on visit
are positive and significant in classes 1 and 2, the estimated coeffi cient on gender is
significant only in class 1. Regarding the employment status (emp), we find that the
coeffi cients on this variable are significant in classes 2 and 3, positive and negative,
respectively.
Since in non-protestor class, class 1, we find positive and significant factor load-
ings on the institutional issues (I2-I4), we may conclude that the individuals that
previously visited the site use the higher values on the Likert scale to answer those
questions. Also, when compared to males in this class, females use the lower values
when responding to those questions.
In protestor class, that is, class 2, the significant positive factor loadings on I1-I4
and F3, and coeffi cients on visit and emp suggest that those that are employed and
have previously visited the site state higher values when responding those attitudinal
questions. Therefore, as taxes represent a high burden on salaries, misuse of tax
revenues by public institutions is a highly sensitive issue, especially for employed
citizens. At the same time, the factor loading on B2 is negative, meaning that
employed respondents who previously visited the site provide lower values when
responding to this attitudinal question, suggesting that they can afford to pay for
the good.
These results also show that individuals in classes 1 and 2 that have previously
visited the site use the upper end of the scale when responding the institutional
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attitudinal questions. Therefore, independently of the degree of protesting, effi ciency
of institutions is an issue for those who show a preference for the valued good.
2.5. Conclusion
We contribute to the CV literature by addressing scale use heterogeneity in the
context of LCM. Our approach enables us to better understand individual behavior
when responding CV surveys that include attitudinal questions.
Our model is applied to a CV survey conducted in the Alto Douro Wine Region,
Portugal, to elicit the WTP to maintain the traditional landscape in the presence of
different sources of protest attitudes. We find evidence that respondents within the
same class, that is, with similar preferences and attitudes, interpret the Likert scale
differently when responding to the attitudinal questions. We show that grouping
individuals into classes with respect to their protest attitudes as well as to the
economic valuation of the good allows for identifying different patterns of scale
usage heterogeneity within a given sample, thereby, highlighting the most sensitive
issues for each particular group and across groups with different characteristics. This
could not be captured without testing for the impact of the subjective scaling.
Finally, the methodology followed is flexible enough to be easily extended and
applied to account for different behavioral and psychological attitudes. While in our
application it is not possible to check how close the predicted WTP is to the actual
unobserved one, it would be interesting to make this comparison in other contexts,
such as when both revealed and stated preference data are available. This is left for
future research.
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2.A. Appendix
2.A.1. Attitudinal Questions
- Budget Constraint Issues (B1—B4):
B1. The values are too high
B2. I can’t afford to pay anything right now
B3. The landscape preservation is not my problem
B4. I would rather pay more important things
- Institutions (I1—I4):
I1. The landscape should be preserved with the current taxes
I2. I think money will be used for other purposes
I3. This payment will not insure the preservation of the landscape
I4. I already pay enough taxes for this preservation
- Fairness Issues (F1—F3):
F1. The residents of the region should pay for this preservation
F2. The local authorities and tourist operators should pay for this preservation
F3. It is not fair to ask me to pay
Notes:
All attitudinal questions were measured on a 5-point Likert scale (from strongly disagree (1) till
strongly agree (5)). However, for some categories there were a few responses, therefore, these
categories were merged to the closest one. In Table 2.2 the responses to the attitudinal questions
with merged categories are presented.
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2.A.2. Tables
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max Description
CV answer 0.32 0.47 0 1 Answer to the CV question (1=Pay, 0=Not Pay)
Bid 46.7 29.7 10 100 Bid for the CV question in Euros
Age 45.3 13.7 18 85 The age of the respondent
Emp 0.78 0.41 0 1 Employment Condition (1=Employed, 0=otherwise)
Visit 0.59 0.49 0 1 (1=If respondent has visited this place before, 0=otherwise)
Gender 0.47 0.25 0 1 (1=If respondent is a female, 0= respondent is a male)
Table 2.2: Distribution of Answers to the Attitudinal Questions (%)
1 2 3 4
B1a 27.2 17.6 37.1 18.1
B2b 8.9 32.6 32.2 26.3
B3b 25.8 54.4 7.1 12.7
B4a 27.9 32 32.7 7.4
I1a 4.2 7.1 60.9 27.8
I2a 11.9 28.9 41.5 17.7
I3a 13 31.6 38.2 17.1
I4a 6.1 12.3 54.4 27.2
F1b 21.1 50.8 13.7 14.3
F2a 18.4 13.7 48.6 19.3
F3a 16.9 15.6 52.1 15.4
Attitudinal 
Questions
Adjusted Scale
Notes:
a. Levels 1 and 2 in a Likert scale are measured in a level 1 in the table
b. Levels 4 and 5 in a Likert scale are measured in a level 4 in the table
Table 2.3: Model Selection Criteria
2 Classes 3 Classes 4 Classes
LL ‐8801 ‐8614 ‐8507
AIC 17848 17593 17509
BIC 18409 18423 18636
ABIC 18019 17845 17851
AICC 17900 17720 17776
CAIC 18075 17928 17965
# of parameters 123 182 247
Number of Classes
Criteria
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Table 2.4: Estimation Results
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Factor Loadings in Equation (2.6)
B1 0.137  (0.73) ‐0.374  (0.11) 0.845  (0.00)
B2 0.752  (0.22) ‐0.407  (0.03) 1.984  (0.11)
B3 0.332  (0.20) 0.412  (0.10) 1.586  (0.00)
B4 0.188  (0.54) 0.249  (0.39) 0.280  (0.27)
I1 0.023  (0.91) 0.929  (0.01) ‐0.099  (0.60)
I2 2.141  (0.00) 1.105  (0.01) ‐0.168  (0.66)
I3 1.242  (0.00) 2.416  (0.01) 0.046  (0.87)
I4 1.720  (0.04) 2.063  (0.02) 0.342  (0.06)
F1 0.227  (0.51) 0.112  (0.79) 1.473  (0.28)
F2 ‐0.010  (0.97) 0.143  (0.62) 0.162  (0.44)
F3 2.808  (0.29) 0.967  (0.02) 0.388  (0.18)
Measurment Equation (2.7)
visit 0.892  (0.00) 0.667  (0.00) ‐0.074  (0.72)
gender ‐0.456  (0.09) 0.222  (0.29) 0.284  (0.36)
emp 0.375 (0.13) 0.821  (0.00) ‐1.321 (0.00)
CV Equation (2.4)
constant 2.730  (0.01) 2.712  (0.14) 0.016  (0.99)
factor 0.281  (0.46) ‐0.486  (0.44) ‐0.159  (0.70)
ln(Bid) ‐0.784  (0.01) ‐0.963  (0.00) ‐0.290  (0.36)
Estimated Ψc in Equation (2.6) 
“Justification Bias”
B1 ‐2.415  (0.09) ‐1.438  (0.00) ‐0.943  (0.39)
B2 ‐2.644  (0.30) ‐1.091  (0.01) 0.487  (0.59)
B3 ‐1.854  (0.00) ‐0.868  (0.01) 0.042  (0.95)
B4 ‐2.470  (0.43) ‐1.364  (0.02) ‐0.243  (0.81)
I1 ‐0.686  (0.19) 0.019  (0.98) ‐0.455  (0.37)
I2 ‐4.321  (0.00) ‐0.846  (0.24) 0.081  (0.86)
I3 ‐2.666  (0.03) ‐1.774 (0.18) ‐0.555  (0.14)
I4 ‐2.473  (0.03) ‐1.243  (0.25) ‐1.167  (0.01)
F1 ‐0.327  (0.65) ‐0.887  (0.17) 0.721  (0.42)
F2 0.366  (0.53) 0.781  (0.17) ‐0.740  (0.45)
F3 ‐3.171  (0.34) ‐1.769  (0.02) ‐2.078  (0.01)
Median(WTP) / S.E. 34.12 / 0.48 8.29 / 0.53 1.48 / 0.25
Confidence Interval of Median(WTP) [ 33.16 , 35.07 ] [ 7.25 , 9.23 ] [ 0.99 , 1.97 ]
Number of Observations per Class 229 220 257
Probability 0.33 0.31 0.36
Entropy
Number of Parameters
Number of Observations
0.78
182
706
Notes:
In parentheses are p-values
WTP is in Euros
SE is a standard error/the standard errors for the median WTP are computed by using the delta
method
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Table 2.5: Estimated Conditional Probabilities of Answers to the Attitudinal Ques-
tions, Pay (%)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
B1a 32 50 17 1 55 7 20 18 46 16 35 3
B2b 1 25 70 4 33 51 9 7 1 28 34 37
B3b 35 59 4 2 55 36 1 8 8 77 7 8
B4a 31 62 7 0 69 14 11 6 25 27 45 3
I1a 3 13 80 4 3 2 24 71 7 9 74 10
I2a 21 77 2 0 11 21 42 26 10 21 61 8
I3a 22 70 8 0 4 18 63 15 20 35 40 5
I4a 3 34 63 0 4 6 31 59 8 18 67 7
F1b 6 63 24 7 72 21 3 4 1 60 14 25
F2a 9 25 63 3 14 4 17 65 28 11 57 4
F3a 6 52 42 0 26 19 46 9 48 22 28 2
Attitudinal 
Questions
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Notes:
a. Levels 1 and 2 in a Likert scale are measured in a level 1 in the table
b. Levels 4 and 5 in a Likert scale are measured in a level 4 in the table
Table 2.6: Estimated Conditional Probabilities of Answers to the Attitudinal Ques-
tions, Not Pay (%)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
B1a 4 24 61 11 23 5 24 48 25 14 54 7
B2b 0 2 60 38 14 49 18 19 2 38 34 26
B3b 8 63 19 10 34 47 3 16 9 77 7 7
B4a 4 49 46 1 36 18 25 21 21 25 50 4
I1a 2 7 84 7 3 3 23 71 5 6 74 15
I2a 0 37 62 1 5 12 38 45 10 22 60 8
I3a 2 42 56 0 1 3 45 51 12 29 51 8
I4a 0 5 95 0 1 2 14 83 3 7 72 18
F1b 5 57 29 9 51 34 7 8 2 74 10 14
F2a 13 30 55 2 27 6 21 46 16 8 68 8
F3a 0 5 95 0 6 6 50 38 10 13 63 14
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3Attitudinal 
Questions
Notes:
a. Levels 1 and 2 in a Likert scale are measured in a level 1 in the table
b. Levels 4 and 5 in a Likert scale are measured in a level 4 in the table
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2.A.3. Figures
Figure 2.1:General Representation of the Model
 
Figure 1: General Representation of the Model 
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Chapter 3.
Life (Dis)satisfaction and the Decision to Migrate:
Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe
coauthored with O. Popova
Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence of the impact of life satisfaction on the
individual intention to migrate. The impacts of individual characteristics and of
country macroeconomic variables on the intention to migrate are analyzed jointly.
We allow for life satisfaction to serve as a mediator between macroeconomic vari-
ables and the intention to migrate. Using the Eurobarometer Survey for 27 Central
Eastern European (CEE) and Western European (non-CEE) countries, we find that
people have a higher intention to migrate when dissatisfied with life. The socio-
economic variables and macroeconomic conditions affect the intention to migrate
indirectly through life satisfaction. The impact of life satisfaction on the intention
to migrate for middle-aged individuals with past experience of migration, low level
of education, and with a low or average income from urban areas is higher in CEE
countries than in non-CEE countries.
Keywords: life satisfaction, migration, decision making
JEL Classification: I31, J61
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3.1. Introduction
The factors driving the individual decision to migrate such as job and educational
opportunities, expected income, relative deprivation, a better provision of social
benefits and public goods, etc., have been widely explored in the literature.1 How-
ever, non-pecuniary aspects also play a role in migration decisions (see Stark [54]).
For instance, during conflict periods such as wars, terrorist attacks, and other re-
gional instabilities, higher migration flows are observed regardless of any pecuniary
aspects.2 Also, the quality of institutions such as civil liberties, political rights, pro-
tection of property rights, corruption, and the level of institutionalized democracies
(e.g., dictatorship) cause migration flows even when monetary benefits are suffi -
ciently high in the country of origin.3 As a result, these non-pecuniary aspects as
well as tastes and culture, hidden reasons and motives such as a feeling of deserving
a better life, and a feeling of fairness, affect the decision to migrate but may not be
observed by a researcher. In this case a life satisfaction measure may be used as a
proxy for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects.4 In fact, many surveys include
questions regarding life satisfaction, where individuals evaluate the overall quality
of their own life, providing the information that can be used for those purposes.
In the literature, only a few studies have investigated the relationship between
life satisfaction and individual decisions and activities. Examples of such studies
are Antecol & Cobb-Clark [4], Clark [17], Freeman [30], among others, who use job
satisfaction as a predictor of future job quits. Lyubomirsky et al. [45] suggest that
satisfied with life people are likely to be more successful and socially active, while
Frey & Stutzer [32] argue that people who are satisfied with life are more likely to
decide to get married. Guven et al. [37] examine the effect of the gap in happiness
1See Berger & Blomquist [5], Borjas[15], De Jong et al. [19], Dustmann [26], Gibson & McKenzie
[33], Greenwood [35], Kennan & Walker [41], Stark [55], Stark & Bloom [56], Stark & Taylor [57],
Stark & Wang [58], Tiebout [60], among others.
2See Bohra-Mishra & Massey [13], Dreher et al. [25], Morrison [47], Sirkeci [52], among others.
3See Bertocchi & Strozzi [6] and [7], among others.
4See Lyubomirsky et al. [46] and De Neve et al. [21].
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between spouses on the probability to divorce. Besides the potential benefit of using
the life satisfaction measure in the analysis, the major cost is potential endogeneity.
For instance, in a recent paper, Guven [36], using the instrumental variable approach
to overcome endogeneity, claims that people who are satisfied with life spend less
and save more.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature on migration and life satisfaction,
and opens the discussion about the ability of using subjective indicators to capture
different factors affecting the migration decision. Using the Eurobarometer survey
for 27 Central Eastern (CEE) and Western European (non-CEE) countries in the
period of 2008, we examine the impact of life satisfaction on the individual intention
to migrate (hereafter, migration decision).5
In our analysis, we distinguish three types of leaves: internal, temporary inter-
national, and permanent international leaves (hereafter, permanent and temporary
migrations). Of particular interest is the impact of life satisfaction on individual
permanent and temporary migration decisions. In order to explain the permanent
and temporary migrations, we combine individual and country level variables that
may affect the migration decision. Individual variables are represented by socio-
economic characteristics such as age, income, education, and past experience of
migration, while country level variables are unemployment, GDP per capita, in-
equality, and the quality of governance. Country level variables and socio-economic
characteristics are allowed to affect the individual migration decision not only di-
rectly but also through life satisfaction. That is, differently from other studies, in
this paper, life satisfaction plays the role of a mediator between country-wide eco-
nomic and political conditions and the individual intention to migrate. The impacts
of individual characteristics and of country macroeconomic variables on the decision
5Central and Eastern European countries in our sample are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Es-
tonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Western European
countries are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus (Republic), Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United King-
dom.
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to migrate are analyzed jointly.
The empirical findings indicate that people have a higher intention to migrate
when dissatisfied with life. The results hold for all types of leaves: internal, tem-
porary international, and permanent international. The socio-economic variables
and macroeconomic conditions have an effect on the intention to migrate indirectly
through life satisfaction. We also find differences in migration decisions between
the CEE and Western Europe. The impact of life satisfaction on the intention to
migrate for middle-aged individuals with past experience of migration, low level of
education, and with a low or average income from urban areas is higher in CEE
countries than in non-CEE countries. The empirical findings of this paper shed
some light on how migration flows vary for different groups of individuals in those
regions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews
the relevant literature. Then we present the empirical framework and robustness
check, describe data, and discuss estimation results. The final section concludes.
3.2. Literature Review
The relationship between migration and life satisfaction has not yet been thoroughly
examined in the economic literature. Existing studies at the individual level focus
mostly on the life satisfaction of actual migrants and of their next generations.
For instance, De Jong, Chamratrithirong, & Tran [20] study the life satisfaction
of migrants in Thailand and argue that life satisfaction typically decreases after
moving to a different place, while Easterlin & Zimmerman [29] argue that migrants
from Eastern to Western Germany are relatively less satisfied than the locals living
in the Western part. Safi [50] also suggests that immigrants in Europe and their
generations are less satisfied than the natives.
At the country level, Blanchflower, Saleheen, & Shadforth [9] and Blanchflower
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& Shadforth [10] analyze the migration flows from Central and Eastern Europe. The
authors find that the higher number of immigrants in the UK is from those CEE
countries that have a lower GDP per capita and a lower average life satisfaction.
Such pattern invites us to attempt to disentangle the effects of country level variables
and life satisfaction on the migration decision in CEE and non-CEE countries.
In labor economics, the use of job satisfaction anchored to labor mobility has
received substantial attention. Most studies in this stream of literature argue that
job dissatisfaction is a strong predictor of job quit intentions as well as actual quits
(see Antecol & Cobb-Clark [4], Bockerman & Ilmakunnas [11], Clark [17], Freeman
[30], Shields & Ward [51], Stevens [59], among others).
In a seminal study, Freeman [30] argues that the importance of satisfaction data
for studying labor mobility is underestimated in the economic literature. The au-
thor suggests using individual satisfaction to evaluate the indirect effects of observed
variables as well as a proxy for unobserved objective factors. For instance, job satis-
faction may serve as an indicator of workplace quality. In line with this suggestion,
Clark [17] points out that different job satisfaction domains, for instance, satisfac-
tion with career opportunities, relations with supervisors, use of initiative, reflect
unobservable job quality characteristics that can be used to measure the probabil-
ity of job quits. Using data from BHPS, the author finds that dissatisfaction with
payment, working hours, the type of work, job security, and the use of initiative are
significant predictors of future actual job quits. Bockerman & Ilmakunnas [11] ana-
lyze Finnish data and argue that job dissatisfaction as a proxy for adverse working
conditions induces quit intentions and actual job quits. The topic of job satisfaction
and quits in different contexts is further explored by Antecol & Cobb-Clark [4] for
military personnel, by Shields & Ward [51] for nurses, and by Stevens [59] for aca-
demics. All these studies underline the role of dissatisfaction in labor mobility and
provide a rationale for studying the implications of dissatisfaction and migration
intention.
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In our paper, we examine the individual intention to migrate, not the actual mi-
gration decision. The psychological theories of reasoned action and planned behavior
suggest that the individual intention predicts the actual decision and behavior.6 As
the predictions of these theories suggest, the better incorporation of individual (e.g.,
information, abilities, and emotions) and external (e.g., opportunity costs and ex-
ternal barriers for performing a behavior) factors into the model of hypothetical
decisions reduces the gap between intended and actual behaviors (see Ajzen & Fish-
bein [2], Ajzen [1], and Hale & Householder [38]). Recently, in the context of a
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, Vlaev [61] argues that real and hypothetical decisions
are different. However, a common critique to such findings is that they cannot be
generalized to the whole population due to the use of students in the experiments.
Also, the actual data may be too costly or rarely available to the researcher.
Data on individual intentions rather than actual labor mobility are also used in
some economic studies (see Antecol & Cobb-Clark [4], Kristensen & Westergerd-
Nielsen [42], Shields & Ward [51], among others). In the context of migration,
empirical evidence in favor of a strong link between the intended and actual decision
is provided by Gordon & Molho [34] and Boheim & Taylor [12]. Gordon & Molho
[34] conclude that in the UK, a high share of people who intend to migrate actually
moves within five years. Furthermore, Boheim & Taylor [12] argue that the actual
probability to move for potential migrants is three times higher than for those who
do not intend to move. Therefore, the analysis of the individual intention to migrate
is important for understanding the actual migration decision-making process.
6See Ajzen & Fishbein [3] for an extensive review of the psychological literature on intentions
and actual behavior; see Rabinovich & Webley [48] for the psychological factors affecting the
realization of intentions into actual behavior.
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3.3. Methodology
3.3.1. The Model
In this section we present the theoretical framework of the individual intention to
migrate. An individual i is faced with a choice between the following alternatives:
stay in the home country (1), move to another country permanently (2), move to
another country temporarily (3), and move within home country (4). Following
Dolan & Kahneman [24], we consider life satisfaction as a proxy to experienced
utility. Using the additive random utility model for multiple alternatives as described
by Cameron & Trivedi [16], the individual utility associated with the kth alternative
can be represented as follows:
Uik = Vik(xi, c) + εik, k = 1, ..., 4 (3.1a)
Vik(xi, c) = x
′
iβk + c
′γk, (3.1b)
where Uik represents the experienced utility of an individual i in a destination k. k
represents four alternatives to migrate. Vik(xi, c) represents the deterministic com-
ponent of utility. In this study Vik(xi, c) is measured by the life satisfaction score.
εik is the random component of utility that stands for individual unobserved char-
acteristics. xi are individual i characteristics such as income, level of education,
employment and marital statuses, past experience of migration, age, and gender. c
represents country characteristics, which may include the level of GDP, unemploy-
ment, income inequality. βk and γk are the parameters of the model.
The individual decision to migrate is based on choosing the alternative with the
highest utility. Even though there may be mental and material costs of the intention
to migrate, without loss of generality, these costs are assumed to be zero.7
An individual i decides to migrate from the home country to the destination k if
7In a seminal study Sjaastad [53] distinguishes between monetary and non-monetary costs of
migration. However, we do not have this information in our data.
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the utility after moving to the destination is higher than the one from staying in the
home country and from all other destinations, Uik > Uih,all k 6= h. The alternative
h of staying in the home country is used as the reference alternative. Thus, the
probability to migrate to the destination k is expressed as follows:
Pr[MigrDecisioni = k] = Pr[Uik > Uih, all k 6= h] = (3.2)
= Pr[Vik(xi, c) + εik > Vih(xi, c) + εih, all k 6= h] =
= Pr[εih − εik 6 Vik(xi, c)− Vih(xi, c), all k 6= h]
The errors εik are assumed to be i.i.d. type 1 extreme value, with density function
f(εik) = e
−εik exp(−e−εik), k = 1, .., 4. (3.3)
Given equations (3.2) and (3.3), we result in a multinomial logit model
Pr[MigrDecisioni = k] =
eVik
eVi1 + eVi2 + eVi3 + eVi4
. (3.4)
Given equation (3.1b), the probability of the decision to migrate from the home
country to the destination k depends negatively on the utility of living in the home
country.8 Since life satisfaction in the destination is not available, Vik(xi, c), with-
out loss of generality, we assume that it is constant for each destination.9 This
assumption can be relaxed in future research.
In our empirical specification, we follow a two-level regression analysis. This type
of analysis allows us to relate and structure the characteristics of individuals and
countries in one framework.10 As can be observed from Figure 1 in the appendix,
8Alternatively, the difference Vik(xi, c) − Vih(xi, c) has to affect the individual decision to mi-
grate positively.
9One way to relax this assumption is to use the average life satisfaction in the country of
destination. However, the individuals in our sample point out several destinations.
10Alternatively, a two-level hierarchical model with random intercepts can be estimated as de-
scribed by Raudenbush & Bryk [49]. However, due to the identification issue of the model, we
estimate it sequentially. The results of both approaches are similar with only a difference in the
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there are two levels, namely, between (country) and within (individual) levels. At
the between level in the rectangle, country political and economic variables such
as GDP per capita, unemployment, inequality and others are included. At the
within level, individual variables appear in the rectangles such as individual socio-
economic characteristics and the variable that represents the individual intention to
migrate. The dashed-dotted arrow from life satisfaction to the intention to migrate
hypothesizes the causal effect. Even though the variable of interest is the intention
to migrate, not the actual decision, there may be the potential endogeneity issue
related to simultaneity. This issue is discussed in the next section.
The econometric model can be expressed as follows: equations (3.5a) and (3.5b1-
3.5b3) are attributed to the within level, while equations (3.6a1-3.6a2) and (3.6b1-
3.6b3) represent the between level.
Pr(MigrDecisioni = k) = F (β0k + β1kLifeSat2i + β2kLifeSat3i+ (3.5a)
+β3kLifeSat4i + β4kEcondi + ηkxi + θk, s + εik)
LifeSatJ∗i = µ0j + µjxi + λj, s + εij, j = 2, 3, 4 (3.5b1-3.5b3)
θk, s = γ0k + γ1kPolitics + γ2kEconomics + γ3kCEE + uk (3.6a1-3.6a2)
λj, s = π0j + π1jPolitics + π2jEconomics + π3jCEE + ζj, (3.6b1-3.6b3)
where the subscript i stands for individual. The variable MigrDecisioni represents
an individual decision to participate in the kth alternative to leave, k = 2, 3, 4, that is
permanent international (k=2), temporary international (k=3), and internal leaves
(k=4). The intention to stay in the home country (k=1) is used as the reference
alternative. LifeSat is an individual’s self-reported satisfaction with life in the home
country; Econdi is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the decision to migrate
is driven by economic factors such as higher expected income, better working and
effi ciency of estimators.
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housing conditions and zero if the factors are non-economic, for instance, moving
closer to family or friends, or expecting a better local environment, among others.
Even though some individuals answered that they do not have the intention to mi-
grate, they also provided the possible reason.11 xi includes individual socio-economic
characteristics, namely, age, gender, marital status, children, income, level of edu-
cation, employment status, living in an urban area, and past migration experience.
θk, s and λj, s are country fixed effects that account for the average country-specific
life satisfaction and the propensity to migrate. Politics and Economics are the
sets of country-level political and economic variables such as GDP per capita, the
unemployment rate, and the Gini coeffi cient. Also, we introduce a dummy vari-
able, CEE, that is equal to one if home country is in Central and Eastern Europe
and zero otherwise. These variables correspond to c in the theoretical model. θk
and λj are mean country-specific intercepts, while εik, εik, uk and ζj are stochastic
disturbances.
The responses to life satisfaction questions are categorically ordered and take
values from one to four in a Likert scale. To evaluate the effects of each level of life
satisfaction on individual migration decision separately, we separate LifeSati into
four dummy variables and use the lowest level of life satisfaction as a base category
in our estimations.
LifeSatJi = 1, if LifeSati = j and 0 otherwise, j = 1, ..., 4
The reliability of subjective data is of potential concern. However, as summarized
by Frey & Stutzer [31] from the economic, sociological, and psychological literature,
life satisfaction data are valid, consistent and reliable measures of individual well-
being. That is, people are able to evaluate own quality of life without systematic
11The exact question is "Regardless of whether you might move to another country or not, which
of the following might encourage you to move to another country?"
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errors. Moreover, life satisfaction is relatively stable over time.12
To analyze the determinants of the individual migration decision, the within level
equations (3.5a) and (3.5b1-3.5b3) are estimated by using the maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE). By estimating equation (3.5a) using a multinomial logit model,
we examine the direct impact of life satisfaction and individual socio-economic char-
acteristics on the probability to migrate abroad permanently, temporarily, or within
a country against the reference category of no leave. To analyze the determinants
of life satisfaction at each level, the equations (3.5b1-3.5b3) are estimated by logit.
The estimates of country dummy variables from equation (3.5a) are taken as de-
pendent variables for equations (3.6a1-3.6a2). These estimates represent the country
fixed effects. We assume that country level political and economic variables affect
the decision to migrate abroad permanently and temporarily and have no effect on
the decision to migrate internally. The decision to migrate internally is likely to be
affected by regional level political and economic variables that are diffi cult to incor-
porate. Therefore, the mean country-specific intercept of the permanent migration
decision and the temporary migration decision are included into the between level,
while the intercept of internal migration is not.
The values for the dependent variables of equations (3.6b1-3.6b3) are the esti-
mates of country dummies from equations (3.5b1-3.5b3). The dependent variables of
these equations represent the average value of being satisfied in a particular country
at the satisfaction levels 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The equations (3.6a1-3.6a2) and
(3.6b1-3.6b3) are estimated by ordinary least squares and allow us to analyze the
effects of country level political and economic variables directly on the permanent
migration decision and on life satisfaction. Since equations (3.5a), (3.5b1-3.5b3) at
within (the individual level) and (3.6a1-3.6a2), (3.6b1-3.6b3) at between (the macro
level) levels are estimated sequentially, we bootstrap the standard errors and cluster
them at the country level.
12See psychological and economic studies on the set point theory of life satisfasction (Clark et
al. [18]; Di Tella et al. [22]; Diener et al. [23]; Lucas et al. [43] and [44], among others).
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3.3.2. Robustness Check
The econometric model presented above may be subject to several potential caveats.
First, even though the use of data on the individuals who intend to migrate instead
of those who actually migrate helps to circumvent a positive selection bias, the
simultaneity bias in the estimates of the effect of life satisfaction on the decision to
migrate is still a potential concern. Some unobserved individual characteristics such
as restlessness, perfectionism, or ambition, may make people both dissatisfied with
life and be prone to migration. However, these concerns of a potential simultaneity
bias are common for all cross-sectional studies on satisfaction and quitting behavior,
for instance, Antecol & Cobb-Clark [4] and Bockerman & Ilmakunnas [11], among
others.
Second, the small number of individuals for each type of migration in our sample
may produce non-robust estimation results, both at individual and country levels.
Finally, there may be the cross-country differences in the life satisfaction measure.
In order to respond to these potential concerns, we redefine the intention to mi-
grate into a binary variable, which is equal to one if an individual intends to migrate
permanently, temporarily, or internally, and zero otherwise. Thus, those who intend
to migrate are treated in the estimation together regardless of the type of potential
migration. To address the simultaneity issue, equations related to the intention to
migrate and to four levels of life satisfaction are estimated simultaneously by using
a multivariate probit. In addition, we estimate a SUR model with the intention to
migrate and life satisfaction equations, where life satisfaction is treated as a con-
tinuous variable. In both models, the correlation of residuals between any level of
life satisfaction and the intention to migrate is not statistically significant.13 These
results suggest that there is no endogeneity problem.
Since the life satisfaction variable is categorically ordered and measured in a
13The estimation results are available upon request.
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Likert scale, this variable can be represented as follows:
LifeSati =

4 if τ 3 < LifeSat
∗
i
3 if τ 2 < LifeSat
∗
i < τ 3
2 if τ 1 < LifeSat
∗
i < τ 2
1 if LifeSat∗i < τ 1
(3.7)
where τ j represents the threshold of switching from category j−1 to category j, for
j = 1, 4, and LifeSat∗i represents the corresponding unobserved life satisfaction.
In order to obtain the unobserved life satisfaction of individuals, we follow the
latent variable approach described by Bollen [14]. The latent variable, LifeSat∗,
is not observed but is inferred from the responses to the question regarding life
satisfaction, according to the following measurement equation:
LifeSat∗i = µxi + λs + Λνi (3.8)
where LifeSat∗i is a continuous latent life satisfaction variable, xi are observed
individual socio-economic characteristics, λs are country fixed effects, and Λ is a
factor loading. νi is a measurement error that follows a logistic distribution.
The continuous representation of life satisfaction allows us to take into account
the cross-country differences in life satisfaction. Also, it helps to avoid the equi-
distance problem. That is, the difference between 1 and 2 in a Likert scale in
life satisfaction may not have the same impact on the intention to migrate as the
difference between 3 and 4. Then, we introduce the unobserved continuous life
satisfaction into the migration equation as follows:
Pr(MigrDecisioni = 1) = F (β0+β1LifeSat
∗
i +β2Econdi+ηxi+θCD+εi) (3.9)
where εi is the stochastic disturbance and follows a logistic distribution. The other
coeffi cients and explanatory variables are interpreted in the same manner as in the
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previous section. Then, equations from (3.7) to (3.9) are estimated simultaneously
using the robust maximum likelihood. After estimating the individual level, we pro-
ceed to the country level estimation. This estimation is similar to the one described
in previous section.
3.4. The Data
The primary data source for examining the model described above is the Euro-
barometer survey in 2008. This is a cross-sectional survey based on nationally rep-
resentative samples that include randomly selected respondents from 27 European
countries, out of which 10 are Central and Eastern European countries.14 There are
about 1000 respondents per country. The survey contains questions on individual
values and attitudes towards life, previous migration experience, the intentions to
migrate in the future, and individual socio-economic characteristics. Since the sur-
vey has no questions on respondent’s income, we use a proxy for income, namely,
the judgement regarding the financial situation of the respondent’s household. The
question that we use is "How would you judge the financial situation of your house-
hold? Very good (4), rather good (3), rather bad (2), very bad (1)."
The question on life satisfaction that we use is "On the whole, are you very sat-
isfied (4), fairly satisfied (3), not very satisfied (2) or not at all satisfied (1) with the
life you lead?". The mean life satisfaction scores for two waves of the Eurobarometer
survey are presented in Table 1 in the appendix. As observed, there are two columns
that correspond to waves of April-May 2008 and October-November 2008. In our
study, we use only the wave of October-November 2008, since this is the only wave
that contains information on both life satisfaction and migration. The highest mean
life satisfaction in our sample is in Denmark, while the lowest is in Bulgaria. People
14The list of countries in our sample is Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus (Republic), the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
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from Central and Eastern Europe report lower levels of life satisfaction than people
from Western European countries. This ranking is consistent with the similar ones
from other databases, e.g. World Values Survey. One may be concerned that the
period used for the analysis coincides with the economic crisis. However, as observed
from Table 1, there are no major changes in the average life satisfaction before and
during the crisis. Moreover, small changes in the average life satisfaction observed
in some countries can be attributed to psychological aspects of individuals such as
the fear of losing a job.
Survey questions about intended migration used in this research are presented
in Figure 2 in the appendix. The following three questions are used to construct
the variable of interest MigrDecisioni, namely "Do you intend to move in the next
five years?"; "Do you intend to move within country or to another country?"; and
"How long do you expect to stay abroad?" As mentioned above, we distinguish three
types of leaves: permanent international, temporary international, and internal. If
an individual responds that he/she intends to move in the next five years within
country, we consider such a response as the intention to migrate internally. If an
individual responds that he/she intends to move in the next five years to another
country for a few weeks, few months, few years, or for more than a few years but
not indefinitely, we consider such a response as the intention to migrate abroad
temporarily. Finally, if an individual responds that he/she intends to move in the
next five years to another country for the rest of his/her life, we consider such a
response as the intention to migrate abroad permanently.
Descriptive statistics for the questions on life satisfaction and intended leaves
are presented in Table 2 in the appendix. The number of intended migrants for
all types of leaves is about 10 percent of our sample. Thus, for some countries, we
may have only a few intended migrants. However, this should not change the main
conclusions of our paper.
The country level data, namely, the real GDP per capita, unemployment rates,
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and Gini coeffi cients are obtained from the Eurostat database. We also use the
Worldwide Governance Indicators (see Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi [40]). The
correlation matrix for the macroeconomic variables is presented in Table 3.
3.5. Results and Discussion
3.5.1. Individual Level Effects
In this section we present and discuss the results for the decisions to migrate perma-
nently, temporarily, and internally. To understand the migration decision at each
level of life satisfaction, life satisfaction in our estimation is represented by three
dummy variables, where the default group corresponds to individuals that indicate
the lowest level of life satisfaction.
Individual level estimation results for the decision to migrate and life satisfaction
are obtained by estimating equations (3.5a) and (3.5b1-3.5b3) and presented in
Tables 4 and 5 in the appendix, respectively. In Table 4, the columns correspond
to the particular intention to migrate, namely permanent, temporary, and internal.
As observed, different levels of life satisfaction have strong negative impact on each
type of the intention to migrate. This means that individuals with higher levels
of life satisfaction have a lower intention to migrate. We also find that different
levels of life satisfaction are jointly statistically significant for all types of migration
intentions (for instance, in the equation for the intention to migrate permanently, the
Lagrange multiplier test (LM)=41.11***).15 Also, the impact of being at satisfaction
level 2, "not very satisfied", is different from the impacts of satisfaction levels 3,
"fairly satisfied", and 4, "very satisfied" (in the equation for the intention to migrate
permanently, LM=32.48*** and LM=12.58***, respectively). These results suggest
that it is important to consider life satisfaction at different levels.
In Table 4, we also observe that older, married, with a child, without past ex-
15***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.
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perience of migration, and employed individuals have a lower intention to migrate,
while the self-employed, from an urban area, and those for whom the decision to
migrate is driven by economic factors have a higher intention to migrate.
In Table 5, the results for the within level (individual) for each level of life
satisfaction are presented. Life satisfaction is higher for married, with higher income
and education, and employed or self-employed individuals and is U-shaped in age
(see column "very satisfied"). These results support the findings from the existing
happiness literature. The effects of all variables in Table 5 represent mediating
relationships with the intentions to migrate. Interestingly enough, even though in
our sample we do not find the effect of income on migration intentions (see Table 4),
this effect is mediated by life satisfaction (see Table 5).16 Thus, empirical findings
suggest that even though the direct effect may not be observed, the relationship
may be established through life satisfaction.
Since our dependent variable, the intention to migrate, is nominal, we have
computed the average marginal effects for the explanatory variables from equation
(3.5a).17 These effects are presented in Table 6A. As observed from this table, an
increase in life satisfaction may lead to the increase in the probability to stay in
the country of residence. In particular, as compared to individuals with satisfaction
level 1, "not at all satisfied", individuals with satisfaction level 3, "fairly satisfied",
and 4, "very satisfied", are more likely to stay by 5.95% and 6.49%, respectively. The
average marginal effects of life satisfaction on the intention to migrate for different
groups of individuals are discussed in details in Section 5.3. However, since the
countries in our sample have different levels of economic development, there may be
important cross-country factors that may affect the individual decision to migrate.
This issue is explored in the next section.
16We also estimated equation (3.5a) without the life satisfaction variable, but we do not find
evidence that income affects the intention to migrate either.
17In our explanations, we multiply the calculated marginal effects by 100.
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3.5.2. Country Level Effects
The migration literature has emphasized the influence of economic and political con-
ditions on the individual migration decision.18 In this paper, we also examine the
relationship between the intention to migrate permanently and temporarily and var-
ious country characteristics. Differently from other studies, we use life satisfaction
as a mediator between the macroeconomic variables and the intention to migrate.
Due to high correlations between macroeconomic variables, we select only the log-
arithm of real GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, and the Gini coeffi cient as
explanatory variables for equations (3.6a1-3.6a2) and (3.6b1-3.6b3) (see Table 3).
We are also interested in analyzing the country level differences in migration
intentions between CEE and non-CEE countries. However, as can be observed from
Table 3, there is a strong negative correlation between the logarithm of real GDP
per capita and a dummy for CEE countries. Thus, we use these variables in different
model specifications.
The results for the model with the logarithm of real GDP per capita and for
the model with CEE are presented in Tables 7A and 7B, respectively. We have
also estimated equations (3.6a1-3.6a2) with government effectiveness and other eco-
nomic variables from Table 3. The results are robust to the choice of explanatory
variables.19
In Tables 7A and 7B, the columns labeled as "INTERCEPT PERMANENT" and
"INTERCEPT TEMPORARY" correspond to equations (3.6a1-3.6a2) for the inten-
tions to migrate permanently and temporarily at the country level.20 As observed
from these columns, none of the macroeconomic variables are statistically signifi-
cant.21 Thus, we do not have evidence that the logarithm of real GDP per capita,
18See Bertocchi & Strozzi [6] and [7], Borjas [15], Dustmann, Fabbri, & Preston [27], Dustmann,
Hatton, & Preston [28], Greenwood [35], Stark [55], Tiebout [60], among others.
19The results are available upon request.
20We assume that country level political and economic variables have no effect on the decisions
to migrate internally.
21We also estimated equation (3.5a) without the life satisfaction variable, but we do not find
evidence that macroeconomic variables affect the intention to migrate either.
72
the unemployment rate, the Gini coeffi cient, and CEE variable affect the intention
migrate permanently or temporarily directly. However, we find that these macro-
economic variables affect life satisfaction (see the columns "INTERCEPT LIFE
SATISFACTION=2, 3, and 4"). In particular, the fraction of individuals "not very
satisfied" (satisfaction level 2) decreases if GDP per capita increases (or a country
belongs to the non-CEE region) and increases if the inequality among individuals
rises, while the fraction of "very satisfied" individuals (satisfaction level 4) increases
with higher GDP per capita (or the non-CEE region), lower unemployment, and
lower inequality among individuals. As a result, we may conclude that the intention
to migrate is affected by these macroeconomic variables through life satisfaction.
As mentioned above, some macroeconomic variables are highly correlated. In
our case, government effectiveness, control of corruption and GDP per capita have
a similar effect on life satisfaction and can be used indifferently. This is especially
relevant for explaining the differences in migration intentions between CEE and non-
CEE countries since governance conditions in these two regions are substantially
different. For instance, according to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (see
Kaufmann et al.[40]), the gap between government effectiveness and the control of
corruption in these two regions is large (0.68 vs. 1.40 for government effectiveness
and 0.37 vs. 1.51 for the control of corruption). According to Kaufmann et al. [40],
the government effectiveness indicator measures the perceptions over the quality of
public services provision and policy implementation, while the control of corruption
measures the perceptions over the use of public power for private interests and the
extent of state capture. All the relationships between country level life satisfaction,
macroeconomic and governance variables have an expected sign and underline the
importance of the improvement of economic and political conditions for individual
satisfaction with life. As a result of improvements in economic development and
control of corruption and governance, individuals intend to migrate less.
To check the robustness of our results, we redefine the migration decision variable
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into a binary variable and treat life satisfaction as a continuous latent variable. The
individual level results are presented in Table 8. As observed from this table, the
results from the modified equations support our previous findings. Also, findings are
similar at the country level for unemployment and the Gini coeffi cients (see Tables
9A and 9B). However, we find that the logarithm of real GDP per capita affects
both the intention to migrate and life satisfaction positively, while a CEE dummy
affects them negatively. This finding can be explained by differences in institutional
quality between CEE and non-CEE countries. For a given income at the individual
level, people from CEE and non-CEE still have different opportunities to migrate.
For instance, in 2008, nationals from CEE countries were still required to have a
work permit to have a job in non-CEE and US labor markets. Overall, our findings
highlight the importance of life satisfaction not only as a predictor of intentions to
migrate, but also as a mediator between economic and political conditions and those
intentions.
3.5.3. Migration Decisions in CEE and Non-CEE Countries
In this section we discuss the individual level differences in intentions to migrate
permanently and temporarily from CEE and non-CEE countries.22 We examine the
impact of life satisfaction on the individual intention to migrate for different groups
of individuals.
To highlight that life satisfaction and expected income have separate effects
on the individual migration decision, we consider those individuals who had the
experience of a long-term migration in the past but still intend to migrate, hereafter
movers.23 The average life satisfaction of these individuals in CEE countries is 2.39,
while in non-CEE countries is 2.88. Individuals who did not migrate in the past
and do not intend to migrate in the future, hereafter stayers, are used as a reference
22Since we study the impact of cross-country differences on the individual migration decision,
we do not discuss the differences in decisions to migrate internally between individuals from CEE
and non-CEE countries.
23We are grateful to David Blanchflower for this point.
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category. The average life satisfaction of stayers in CEE and non-CEE countries is
2.63 and 3.04, respectively.
Comparing the average life satisfaction scores for movers and stayers, we find that
movers have lower life satisfaction scores than stayers in the same region. Consider-
ing the responses of these individuals regarding the judgement of their households’
current financial situation, we find that the average score for the financial situation
for movers and stayers in CEE countries is very similar (2.42 vs 2.45). Therefore,
we may conclude that movers in CEE countries met their income expectations by
migrating, but they are still not satisfied with the quality of their own lives and, as
a result, life dissatisfaction may drive them to migrate again. However, this effect
is ambiguous in non-CEE countries. Even though the life satisfaction of movers
from non-CEE is lower than the life satisfaction of stayers in this region (2.88 vs.
3.04), their judgement of their own financial situation is slightly different (2.68 for
movers and 2.75 for stayers). Therefore, it might be the case that movers in non-
CEE countries did not meet their income expectations and were not satisfied with
the quality of their own lives. As a result, it is less clear whether the income or the
life satisfaction effect dominates in the intention to migrate for individuals from the
non-CEE region.
It should be noted that the results presented in this section are always in com-
parison with the reference group that represents "not at all satisfied" individuals.
Comparing the average marginal effects for CEE and non-CEE countries in Table
6B, we observe that with an increase in life satisfaction the probability to migrate
permanently and temporarily decreases more for individuals from non-CEE than
from CEE. For instance, the probability of the intention to migrate permanently of
"very satisfied" individuals is lower in comparison with that of "not at all satisfied"
by 2.22% and 1.23% (by 1.73% and 2.16% in the case of temporary migration) in
non-CEE and CEE countries, respectively. In other words, if the life satisfaction of
individuals increases by the same amount in both regions, the individuals from CEE
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intend to migrate more. This result is in line with the widely documented differences
in social and economic conditions in East European compared to Western countries.
Thus, policies regulating migration flows from CEE countries should not be taken
independently from improvements to well-being in the region.
In Table 6B, we compute the average marginal effects of life satisfaction on the
intention to migrate for each level of income, employment status, education, age, past
experience of migration, and regional location of CEE and non-CEE individuals. As
observed, if life satisfaction increases, non-CEE individuals intend to migrate less
than CEE individuals at each level of income. For instance, the probability to
migrate permanently for "very satisfied" individuals with income level 4 is lower
by 2.49% and 1.42% (by 1.69% and 2.11% in the case of temporary migration)
in non-CEE and CEE countries, respectively. The intuition behind this result is
based on different income and employment prospects for people from CEE and
non-CEE countries. According to data from the Eurostat, the average net nominal
monthly earnings in non-CEE countries is about 1600EUR, while in CEE countries
is 460EUR. At the same time, the average long-term unemployment rate is about
2% of the active population in non-CEE and 3% in CEE countries. Given huge wage
differentials and higher unemployment rate in the CEE region, individuals from this
region are more likely to migrate to find a job abroad.
The results are further compared between the individuals with and without past
migration experience. In non-CEE countries, "very satisfied" individuals with past
migration experience have lower intentions to migrate permanently than "not at
all satisfied" by 5.16%, while in CEE countries, these individuals intend to migrate
less by 3.22%. Thus, once an individual migrated and met his/her expectations
regarding life satisfaction, he/she intends to migrate less.
We also find that as compared to "not at all satisfied", the "fairly satisfied" and
"very satisfied" self-employed individuals from non-CEE countries have a lower in-
tention to migrate permanently than those from CEE, by 3.67% and 3.94% and by
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2.12% and 2.27% (by 2.43% and 2% and by 2.9% and 2.53% in the case of temporary
migration), respectively. In fact, the average life satisfaction of self-employed indi-
viduals in CEE countries is 2.78, while in non-CEE countries is 3.05. This difference
is likely to be due to the lower quality of institutions in the CEE region. According
to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (see Kaufmann et al.[40]), CEE countries
underperform non-CEE countries in regulatory quality and rule of law, which is
measured by the perceptions of regulations that allow and promote private sector
development, degree of enforcement of property rights, the quality of the police,
and the courts (0.99 vs. 1.42 and 0.63 vs. 1.46, respectively). Therefore, the life
satisfaction of self-employed individuals may convey information about the quality
of the business environment in the country where they work.
A similar pattern is observed for the "fairly satisfied" and "very satisfied" em-
ployed individuals; the probability to migrate permanently is lower by 1.95% and
2.09% for the non-CEE individuals and by 1.07% and 1.14% for the CEE ones (by
2.09% and 1.76% and by 2.45% and 2.17% in the case of temporary migration).
For the "fairly satisfied" and "very satisfied" individuals who are not employed, we
find that the intention to migrate is lower in non-CEE countries than in CEE, by
2.08% and 2.21% and by 1.16% and 1.24% (by 2.01% and 1.67% and by 2.42% and
2.12% in the case of temporary migration), respectively.24 These results suggest that
individuals have lower intentions to migrate from regions where the social benefits
are higher, which are consistent with the findings of previous literature (see Borjas
[15]). For instance, according to data from the Eurostat, the average monthly unem-
ployment benefit in non-CEE countries is about 370EUR, while in CEE countries,
it is about 70EUR. Thus, the higher intentions to migrate from CEE of those who
are not employed may reflect their dissatisfaction with the social security system.
This point also finds support in the migration intention of individuals with different
levels of education. We find that as compared to the "not at all satisfied" from the
24In Table 6B, those who are not employed are denoted as "Not Working". This group of
individuals consists of the unemployed, retired, and housekeepers.
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same region, the "very satisfied", individuals with less than 15 years of education
in CEE countries have a lower intention to migrate by 1.04%, while in non-CEE
countries this difference is 1.92%. Higher educated individuals at all levels of life
satisfaction have lower intentions to migrate than the lower educated although they
are still more likely to migrate from CEE countries.
Differences in the quality of the social security system and the quality of insti-
tutions may also be reflected in the migration intentions of individuals at different
ages. In Table 6B, we also split the results for the individuals in five age groups: 20,
30, 40, 50, and 60 years old. We find that at all levels of life satisfaction migration
intentions decrease with age. The highest difference between CEE and non-CEE
countries in the intention to migrate permanently is observed for the age group of
30-year old. In CEE countries, where the quality of institutions and opportunities is
lower, 30-year old "very satisfied" individuals intend to migrate by less 1.71%, while
in non-CEE countries, "very satisfied" individuals of the same age group intend to
migrate by less 3.10%.
Finally, we compare the average marginal effects of being a "not at all satisfied"
individual with a "very satisfied" one from rural and urban areas in Table 6B. We ob-
serve that the probabilities of the intention to migrate permanently and temporarily
from urban areas decrease by 1.38% and 2.49% in CEE countries and by 2.38% and
1.89% in non-CEE countries, respectively. Thus, dissatisfied individuals are likely
to migrate more from urban areas in CEE, where they have more opportunities and
better access to information to migrate abroad.
As our results suggest, the impact of life satisfaction on the intention to migrate
for different groups of individuals in CEE is higher than in non-CEE countries.
As discussed above, the life satisfaction measure may convey useful information
regarding the quality of institutions and the business environment, the employment
situation, and the development of a social security system in a region.
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3.6. Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence of the impact of life satisfaction on the
individual intention to migrate. The effects of both individual and country level
factors on the intention to migrate are analyzed jointly. The empirical findings
of this paper suggest that people dissatisfied with life have a higher intention to
migrate. The individual socio-economic factors and macroeconomic conditions have
an effect on the intention to migrate indirectly through life satisfaction. These
empirical findings underline the importance of individual life satisfaction not only
as a strong predictor of the individual migration decision, but also as a mediator
between individual socio-economic variables and macroeconomic conditions and this
decision.
Additionally, we analyze the differences in intentions to migrate permanently and
temporarily for the Central Eastern European (CEE) countries and the Western
European (non-CEE) countries. The impact of life satisfaction on the intention
to migrate from CEE and non-CEE countries is examined for different groups of
individuals. We find that at all levels of life satisfaction individuals with similar
characteristics have higher intentions to migrate from CEE countries than from non-
CEE countries. The low level of life satisfaction of individuals from CEE countries
may be associated with the lower quality of institutions and business environment
and with the development of the social security system in this region. Improvements
in these conditions will result in an increase in individual life satisfaction and, thus,
will lower individual migration intentions.
Our findings can be generalized to the migration decisions in regions with con-
flicts or natural disasters, with a low quality of institutions, and with economic
crises. It may also be interesting to apply our model to study more in detail internal
migration. This will be left for future research.
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3.A. Appendix
3.A.1. Tables
Table 3.1: Sample Mean Life Satisfaction Scores                 
Country 
Wave Apr‐May 2008  Wave Oct‐Nov 2008 
Rank  Mean Life Satisfaction 
Std. 
Dev.  Rank 
Mean Life 
Satisfaction 
Std. 
Dev. 
Denmark  1  3.614  0.577  1  3.616  0.580 
Netherlands  2  3.450  0.604  2  3.495  0.564 
Sweden  3  3.447  0.604  3  3.457  0.556 
Luxembourg  4  3.393  0.638  4  3.304  0.695 
Finland  5  3.272  0.608  5  3.275  0.570 
Ireland  6  3.266  0.673  7  3.173  0.682 
United Kingdom  7  3.201  0.695  6  3.193  0.692 
Malta  8  3.144  0.687  11  3.030  0.762 
Cyprus (Republic)  9  3.118  0.672  9  3.120  0.740 
Belgium  10  3.111  0.724  8  3.125  0.690 
Slovenia  11  3.094  0.638  10  3.046  0.710 
Spain  12  3.016  0.615  12  2.966  0.624 
Austria  13  2.997  0.620  13  2.965  0.639 
Germany  14  2.923  0.724  14  2.955  0.715 
France  15  2.904  0.736  16  2.890  0.730 
Czech Republic  16  2.903  0.594  15  2.907  0.574 
Estonia  17  2.808  0.659  18  2.796  0.621 
Poland  18  2.800  0.732  17  2.804  0.668 
Slovakia  19  2.681  0.711  19  2.728  0.721 
Greece  20  2.671  0.745  23  2.480  0.751 
Lithuania  21  2.638  0.802  20  2.627  0.782 
Latvia  22  2.623  0.745  22  2.611  0.730 
Italy  23  2.619  0.720  21  2.613  0.699 
Romania  24  2.483  0.760  24  2.391  0.745 
Portugal  25  2.462  0.732  25  2.361  0.744 
Hungary  26  2.347  0.825  26  2.301  0.808 
Bulgaria  27  2.218  0.862  27  2.170  0.793 
 
 
Source: constructed by the authors using the Eurobarometer Survey.
Notes: Countries are ranked according to the mean life satisfaction score in the wave collected dur-
ing April-May 2008. The wave collected during October-November 2008 is used for the estimations.
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are shaded.
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Table 3.2: The Number of Intended Leaves by Life Satisfaction
 
   Life Satisfaction 
     
1 (not at all 
satisfied) 
2 (not very 
satisfied) 
3 (fairly 
satisfied) 
4 (very 
satisfied) 
Total number of 
respondents  Percent  Cumul. 
In
te
nd
ed
 L
ea
ve
 
0 (permanent 
international)  19  52  94  41  206  0.85  0.85 
1 (temporary 
international)  40  145  347  196  728  3.00  3.85 
2 (internal)  65  188  858  414  1 525  6.29  10.15 
3 (no leave)  1 189  4 286  11 927  4 371  21 773  89.85  100.00 
Total number of 
respondents  1 313  4 671  13 226  5 022  24 232 
Percent  5.42  19.28  54.58  20.72 
Cumul.  5.42  24.69  79.28  100.00          
 
 Source: constructed by the authors using the Eurobarometer Survey.
Table 3.3: The Correlation Matrix for Macroeconomic Variables
 
  
CEE  Log(Real GDP per Capita) 
Unemployment 
Rate  Inflation  Rate 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Control of 
Corruption  Gini  Coefficient 
CEE  1.0000 
Log(Real GDP per Capita)  ‐0.8487  1.0000 
Unemployment Rate  0.0491  ‐0.2013  1.0000 
Inflation Rate  0.7088  ‐0.6932  0.0006  1.0000 
Government Effectiveness  ‐0.6348  0.8363  ‐0.3500  ‐0.5422  1.0000 
Regulatory Quality  ‐0.5798  0.7657  ‐0.3242  ‐0.4183  0.8889  1.0000 
Control of Corruption  ‐0.6989  0.8641  ‐0.3230  ‐0.5906  0.9489  0.8860  1.0000 
Gini Coefficient  0.1501  ‐0.4152  0.2509  0.5019  ‐0.5754  ‐0.4234  ‐0.4834  1.0000 
 
 Source: constructed by the authors using the Eurostat and WGI data from Kaufmann et al. [40].
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Table 3.4: Within Level Results for the Decision to Migrate
Table 4: Within Level Results for the Intention to Migrate 
 
Multinomial Logit Estimation  Intention to Migrate PERMANENTLY 
Intention to Migrate 
TEMPORARILY 
Intention to Migrate 
INTERNALLY 
Constant  ‐2.275  ***  (0.566)  ‐1.159 ***  (0.298)  0.176 (0.205) 
Life Satisfaction =2                   
(Not Very Satisfied)  ‐0.571  *  (0.312)  ‐0.360 *  (0.189)  ‐0.450 ***  (0.110) 
Life Satisfaction =3                  
(Fairly Satisfied)  ‐1.458  ***  (0.328)  ‐0.877 ***  (0.198)  ‐0.460 ***  (0.120) 
Life Satisfaction =4                     
(Very Satisfied)  ‐1.661  ***  (0.447)  ‐0.772 ***  (0.203)  ‐0.598 ***  (0.151) 
Married  ‐0.476  ***  (0.134)  ‐0.537 ***  (0.143)  ‐0.476 ***  (0.074) 
Male  0.244  (0.183)  0.237 **  (0.093)  0.037 (0.074) 
Age  ‐0.036  ***  (0.009)  ‐0.069 ***  (0.005)  ‐0.051 ***  (0.003) 
Child  ‐0.240  (0.163)  ‐0.215 *  (0.115)  ‐0.160 **  (0.062) 
Income  0.110  (0.110)  ‐0.009 (0.082)  0.006 (0.035) 
Urban  0.468  ***  (0.165)  0.529 ***  (0.123)  0.234 ***  (0.067) 
Education 15‐19 Years  0.395  *  (0.206)  0.226 (0.223)  0.100 (0.088) 
Education 20 or More Years  0.231  (0.310)  0.671 ***  (0.222)  0.253 **  (0.100) 
Student  0.437  (0.412)  1.019 ***  (0.243)  ‐0.035 (0.147) 
Econd  0.692  ***  (0.220)  0.412 ***  (0.124)  0.391 ***  (0.073) 
Employed  ‐0.168  (0.175)  ‐0.044 (0.115)  ‐0.169 *  (0.101) 
Self‐employed  0.777  ***  (0.293)  0.362 **  (0.176)  ‐0.051 (0.158) 
Past Migration Experience  1.436  ***  (0.191)  1.618 ***  (0.157)  0.408 ***  (0.129) 
Country Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R‐Squared  0.208  0.208  0.208 
Number of Observations  24232  24232  24232 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.  
Life satisfaction =1 (”not at all satisfied”) is used as the base category of life satisfaction; less than 15 years of education and no full time 
education are used as the base category for education level; those who do not work are used as the base category for employment status.  
Econd is a dummy equal to one if the intention to migrate abroad is driven by economic factors. For the individuals who intend to migrate 
internally, Econd stands for the factors in the case of a hypothetical migration abroad. 
  
Not s:
Stand rd e ors cluster d a th country l vel are in pa entheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10
% significance levels, respectively. Life satisfaction =1 (" ot at all satisfied") is used as the base
category of life satisfaction; less than 15 years of education and no full time education are used
as the base category for education level; those who do not work are used as the base category for
employment status. Econd is a dummy equal to one if the intention to migrate abroad is driven
by economic factors. For the individuals who intend to migrate internally, Econd stands for the
factors in the case of a hypothetical migration abroad.
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Table 3.5: Within Level Results for Life Satisfaction
Table 5: Within Level Results for Life Satisfaction 
 
Logit Estimation  LIFE SATISFACTION=2       (Not Very Satisfied) 
LIFE SATISFACTION=3     
(Fairly Satisfied) 
LIFE SATISFACTION=4     
(Very Satisfied) 
Constant  ‐0.157  (0.293)  ‐0.909 **  (0.374)  ‐3.641 ***  (0.281) 
Married  ‐0.201  ***  (0.059)  ‐0.008 (0.054)  0.441 ***  (0.041) 
Male  ‐0.013  (0.035)  ‐0.004 (0.035)  ‐0.079 (0.052) 
Age  0.041  ***  (0.008)  ‐0.010 (0.006)  ‐0.052 ***  (0.010) 
Age squared/1000  ‐0.396  ***  (0.088)  0.099 (0.065)  0.435 ***  (0.089) 
Child  ‐0.073  (0.047)  ‐0.045 (0.040)  0.053 (0.049) 
Income  ‐0.974  ***  (0.072)  0.443 *** (0.131)  1.245 ***  (0.076) 
Urban  0.031  (0.043)  0.069 *  (0.038)  ‐0.091 *  (0.046) 
Education 15‐19 Years  ‐0.063  (0.074)  0.134 *** (0.049)  ‐0.027 (0.071) 
Education 20 or More Years  ‐0.273  ***  (0.088)  0.074 (0.061)  0.264 ***  (0.073) 
Student  ‐0.541  ***  (0.116)  0.129 (0.096)  0.499 ***  (0.095) 
Employed  ‐0.038  (0.070)  0.193 *** (0.048)  ‐0.104 (0.073) 
Self‐employed  ‐0.079     (0.080)  0.158 *** (0.048)  0.041    (0.072) 
Country Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R‐squared  0.187  0.051  0.249 
Number of Observations  24232  24232  24232 
 
Source:authors’ calculations.  
Notes: Standard errors clustered at a country level are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.  
Less than 15 years of education and no full time education are used as the base category for education level,those who do not work are used as the 
base category for employment status. 
  
Not s:
Standard errors clustered at a country level are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10
% significance levels, respectively. Less than 15 years of education and no full time education are
used as the base category for education level,those who do not work are used as the base category
for employment status.
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Table 3.6A: Average Marginal Effects for the Decision to MigrateTable 6A: Average Marginal Effects for the Intention to Migrate 
 
Average Marginal Effects  The Effect on Probability to Migrate PERMANENTLY 
The Effect on Probability to 
Migrate TEMPORARILY 
The Effect on Probability to 
Migrate INTERNALLY 
The Effect on Probability of    
NO LEAVE 
Life Satisfaction =2                              
(Not Very Satisfied)  ‐0.0086    (0.007)  ‐0.0088   (0.007)  ‐0.0232 ***  (0.007)  0.0407 ***  (0.011) 
Life Satisfaction =3                           
(Fairly Satisfied)  ‐0.0173  **  (0.007)  ‐0.0221 ***  (0.007)  ‐0.0202 **  (0.009)  0.0595 ***  (0.011) 
Life Satisfaction =4                            
(Very Satisfied)  ‐0.0185  **  (0.007)  ‐0.0189 ***  (0.007)  ‐0.0275 ***  (0.010)  0.0649 ***  (0.013) 
Married  ‐0.0031  ***  (0.001)  ‐0.0111 ***  (0.003)  ‐0.0224 ***  (0.004)  0.0366 ***  (0.005) 
Male  0.0018  (0.001)  0.0058 **  (0.002)  0.0007 (0.004)  ‐0.0083 *  (0.005) 
Age  ‐0.0002  ***  (0.000)  ‐0.0015 ***  (0.000)  ‐0.0024 ***  (0.000)  0.0041 ***  (0.000) 
Child  ‐0.0016  (0.001)  ‐0.0046 *  (0.003)  ‐0.0072 **  (0.003)  0.0134 ***  (0.005) 
Income  0.0009  (0.001)  ‐0.0003 (0.002)  0.0003 (0.002)  ‐0.0008 (0.003) 
Urban   0.0031  ***  (0.001)  0.0115 ***  (0.003)  0.0096 ***  (0.003)  ‐0.0241 ***  (0.004) 
Education 15‐19 Years  0.0030  (0.002)  0.0052 (0.006)  0.0039 (0.005)  ‐0.0121 *  (0.007) 
Education 20 or More Years  0.0012  (0.003)  0.0176 ***  (0.007)  0.0102 *  (0.005)  ‐0.0289 ***  (0.008) 
Student  0.0032  (0.004)  0.0328 ***  (0.010)  ‐0.0071 (0.007)  ‐0.0289 **  (0.013) 
Econd  0.0049  ***  (0.002)  0.0083 ***  (0.003)  0.0183 ***  (0.004)  ‐0.0315 ***  (0.005) 
Employed  ‐0.0012  (0.001)  ‐0.0003 (0.003)  ‐0.0086 *  (0.005)  0.0100 (0.007) 
Self‐employed   0.0083  **  (0.004)  0.0098 *  (0.005)  ‐0.0053 (0.008)  ‐0.0128 (0.011) 
Past Migration Experience  0.0160  ***  (0.003)  0.0597 ***  (0.009)  0.0102 (0.007)  ‐0.0859 ***  (0.011) 
Country Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  24232  24232  24232  24232 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Standard errors calculated by the Delta method are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.  
Econd is a dummy equal to one if the intention to migrate abroad is driven by economic factors. For the individuals who intend to migrate internally or do not intend to leave, Econd 
stands for the factors in the case of a hypothetical migration abroad. 
  
Notes:
Standard errors calculated by the Delta method are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and
10 % significance levels, respectively. Econd is a dummy equal to one if the intention to migrate
abroad is driven by economic factors. For the individuals who intend to migrate internally or do
not intend to leave, Econd stands for the factors in the case of a hypothetical migration abroad.
Table 3.6A (cont.): Average Marginal Effects for Life SatisfactionTable 6A (cont.): Average Marginal Effects for Life Satisfaction 
 
Average Marginal Effects, 
Logit 
LIFE SATISFACTION=2    
(Not Very Satisfied) 
LIFE SATISFACTION=3 
(Fairly Satisfied) 
LIFE SATISFACTION=4 
(Very Satisfied) 
Married  ‐0.0254  ***  (0.007)  ‐0.0019 (0.013)  0.0532 ***  (0.005) 
Male  ‐0.0016  (0.004)  ‐0.0009 (0.008)  ‐0.0095 (0.006) 
Age  0.0052  ***  (0.001)  ‐0.0022 (0.001)  ‐0.0063 ***  (0.001) 
Age squared / 1000  ‐0.0498  ***  (0.011)  0.0229 (0.015)  0.0529 ***  (0.011) 
Child  ‐0.0091  (0.006)  ‐0.0105 (0.009)  0.0065 (0.006) 
Income  ‐0.1226  ***  (0.007)  0.1023 ***  (0.029)  0.1513 ***  (0.008) 
Urban  0.0039  (0.005)  0.0159 *  (0.009)  ‐0.0111 *  (0.006) 
Education 15‐19 Years  ‐0.0080  (0.009)  0.0309 ***  (0.011)  ‐0.0033 (0.009) 
Education 20 or More Years  ‐0.0335  ***  (0.010)  0.0169 (0.014)  0.0329 ***  (0.009) 
Student  ‐0.0614  ***  (0.012)  0.0295 (0.022)  0.0653 ***  (0.014) 
Employed  ‐0.0047  (0.009)  0.0446 ***  (0.011)  ‐0.0126 (0.009) 
Self‐employed  ‐0.0098     (0.010)  0.0362 ***  (0.011)  0.0051    (0.009) 
Country Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  24232  24232  24232 
 
Source: authors’ calculations.  
Notes: Standard errors calculated by the Delta method are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
  
Not s:
Stand rd e ors c lculat d by e Delt m thod are i parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and
10 % significance levels, respectively.
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Table 3.7A: Between Level Results for Life Satisfaction and the Decision to Migrate
(with GDP)Table 7A: Between Level Results for Life Satisfaction and the Intention to Migrate (with GDP) 
 
OLS estimation  INTERCEPT PERMANENT 
INTERCEPT 
TEMPORARY 
INTERCEPT                 
LIFE SATISFACTION=2 
(Not Very Satisfied) 
INTERCEPT               
LIFE SATISFACTION=3 
(Fairly Satisfied) 
INTERCEPT                 
LIFE SATISFACTION=4 
(Very Satisfied) 
Constant  ‐7.446  (16.112)  ‐2.414  (2.009)  3.583  **  (1.654)  0.271  (1.855)  ‐5.289  **  (2.164) 
Ln(Real GDP per capita)  1.299  (1.437)  0.178  (0.149)  ‐0.577  ***  (0.118)  ‐0.045  (0.133)  0.751  ***  (0.147) 
Unemployment  ‐0.696  (0.778)  ‐0.023  (0.102)  0.066  (0.058)  0.106  (0.065)  ‐0.112  *  (0.069) 
Gini  ‐0.103  (0.207)  0.023  (0.030)  0.060  **  (0.024)  ‐0.020  (0.028)  ‐0.057  **  (0.029) 
Adj. R‐squared  0.121  ‐0.081  0.649  0.096  0.672 
Number of Observations  27  27  27  27  27 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 Notes: The dependent variable is a mean country-specific intercept of the decision to migrate permanently or temporarily (life satisfaction) from the within level.  
Robust bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 7B: Between Level Results for Life Satisfaction and the Decision to Migrate (with CEE) 
 
OLS estimation  INTERCEPT PERMANENT 
INTERCEPT 
TEMPORARY 
INTERCEPT                
LIFE SATISFACTION=2 
(Not Very Satisfied) 
INTERCEPT                 
LIFE SATISFACTION=3 
(Fairly Satisfied) 
INTERCEPT                
LIFE SATISFACTION=4 
(Very Satisfied) 
Constant  8.122  (5.825)  ‐0.300  (1.073)  ‐3.272  ***  (0.808)  ‐0.258  (0.731)  3.625  ***  (1.049) 
CEE  ‐0.872  (1.671)  ‐0.205  (0.307)  0.745  ***  (0.222)  0.130  (0.196)  ‐0.995  ***  (0.275) 
Unemployment  ‐0.751  (0.713)  ‐0.030  (0.094)  0.089  (0.065)  0.108  *  (0.056)  ‐0.143  **  (0.069) 
Gini  ‐0.184  (0.233)  0.013  (0.032)  0.090  ***  (0.025)  ‐0.019  (0.024)  ‐0.096  ***  (0.036) 
Adj. R‐squared  0.079  ‐0.097  0.571  0.113  0.598 
Number of Observations  27  27  27  27  27 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The dependent variable is a mean country-specific intercept of the decision to migrate permanently or temporarily (life satisfaction) from the within level.  
Robust bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
  
Notes:
The dependent v riable is a mean country-s ecific intercept f the decision to migrate p rmanently
or temporarily (life satisfaction) from the within level. Robust bootstrapped standard errors
clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 % significance
levels, respectively.
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Unemployment  ‐0.696  (0.778)  ‐0.023  (0.102)  0.066  (0.058)  0.106  (0.065)  ‐0.112  *  (0.069) 
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Source: authors’ calculations. 
 Notes: The dependent variable is a mean country-specific intercept of the decision to migrate permanently or temporarily (life satisfaction) from the within level.  
Robust bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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CEE  ‐0.872  (1.671)  ‐0.205  (0.307)  0.745  ***  (0.222)  0.130  (0.196)  ‐0.995  ***  (0.275) 
Unemployment  ‐0.751  (0.713)  ‐0.030  (0.094)  0.089  (0.065)  0.108  *  (0.056)  ‐0.143  **  (0.069) 
Gini  ‐0.184  (0.233)  0.013  (0.032)  0.090  ***  (0.025)  ‐0.019  (0.024)  ‐0.096  ***  (0.036) 
Adj. R‐squared  0.079  ‐0.097  0.571  0.113  0.598 
Number of Observations  27  27  27  27  27 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The dependent variable is a mean country-specific intercept of the decision to migrate permanently or temporarily (life satisfaction) from the within level.  
Robust bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
  
Notes:
The dependent v riable is a mean country-s ecific intercept f the decision to migrate p rmanently
or temporarily (life satisfaction) from the within level. Robust bootstrapped standard errors
clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 % significance
levels, respectively.
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Table 3.8: Within Level Results for the Robustness Checkl  8: Within Level Result  for the Robustness Check 
 
Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation  Intention to Migrate     Life Satisfaction 
Constant  ‐0.134     (0.270)    
Life Satisfaction  ‐0.275  ***  (0.083)    
Married  ‐0.365  ***  (0.070)  Married  0.720  ***  (0.081) 
Male  0.085  *  (0.051)  Male  ‐0.166  ***  (0.052) 
Age  ‐0.058  ***  (0.003)  Age  ‐0.085  ***  (0.011) 
      Age squared/1000  0.756  ***  (0.102) 
Child  ‐0.189  ***  (0.058)  Child  0.030  (0.055) 
Income  0.606  ***  (0.190)  Income  2.450  ***  (0.165) 
Urban  0.294  ***  (0.055)  Urban  ‐0.133  ***  (0.046) 
Education 15‐19 Years  0.151  *  (0.092)  Education 15‐19 Years  0.154  **  (0.064) 
Education 20 or More Years  0.439  ***  (0.106)  Education 20 or More Years  0.569  ***  (0.080) 
Student  0.624  ***  (0.167)  Student  1.150  ***  (0154) 
Econd  0.419  ***  (0.052)    
Employed  ‐0.163  **  (0.069)  Employed  0.111  *  (0.060) 
Self‐employed  0.152  (0.107)  Self‐employed  0.248  ***  (0.093) 
Past Migration Experience  0.928  ***  (0.073)    
Country Dummies  Yes  Country Dummies  Yes 
Number of Observations  24232  Number of Observations  24232 
 
Source: authors’ calculations.  
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.  
The migration intention is a binary variable. Life satisfaction is treated as a continuous latent variable.  
Less than 15 years of education and no full time education are used as the base category for the education level;those who do not work are used are used as the base category for employment status. 
  
Not s:
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 % significance
levels, respectively. The migration intention is a binary variable. Life satisfaction is treated as a
continuous latent variable. Less than 15 years of education and no full time education are used
as the base category for the education level;those who do not work are used are used as the base
category for employment status.
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Table 3.9A: Between Level Results for the Robustness Check (with GDP)able 9A: Between Level Results for the Robustness Check (with GDP) 
 
OLS estimation  INTERCEPT MIGRATION  INTERCEPT              LIFE SATISFACTION 
Constant  ‐7.642  ***  (2.203)  ‐7.795  **  (3.009)
Ln(Real GDP per capita)  0.824  ***  (0.149)  1.125  ***  (0.203)
Unemployment  ‐0.082  (0.085)  ‐0.156  (0.121)
Gini  ‐0.016  (0.035)  ‐0.088  **  (0.043)
Adj. R‐squared  0.480  0.701 
Number of Observations  27  27 
 
Source: authors’ calculations.  
Notes: The dependent variable is a mean country-specific intercept of the decision to migrate (life satisfaction) from the within level.  
Robust bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 9B:Between Level Results for the Robustness Check (with CEE) 
 
OLS estimation  INTERCEPT MIGRATION  INTERCEPT               LIFE SATISFACTION 
Constant  2.171  *  (1.231)  5.561 *** (1.330)
CEE  ‐0.963  ***  (0.358)  ‐1.497 *** (0.343)
Unemployment  ‐0.116  (0.094)  ‐0.201 *  (0.115)
Gini  ‐0.060  (0.043)  ‐0.145 *** (0.041)
Adj. R‐squared  0.327  0.625 
Number of Observations  27  27 
 
Source: authors’ calculations.  
Notes: The dependent variable is a mean country-specific intercept of the decision to migrate (life satisfaction) from the within level.  
Robust bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
Not s:
The dependent variable is a mean country-specific intercept of the decision to migrate (life satis-
faction) from the within level. Robust bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the country level
are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 % significance levels, respectively.
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OLS  stimation  INTERCEPT MIGRATION INTERCEPT              LIFE SATISFACTION 
Constant  ‐7.642  ***  (2.203)  ‐7.795  **  (3.009)
Ln(Real GDP per capita)  0.824  ***  (0.149)  1.125  ***  (0.203)
Unemployment  ‐0.082  (0.085)  ‐0.156  (0.121)
Gini  ‐0.016  (0.035)  ‐0.088  **  (0.043)
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Numb r of Observations  27  27 
 
Source: authors’ calculations.  
Notes: The dependent variable is a mean country-specific intercept of the decision to migrate (life satisfaction) from the within level.  
Robust bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
a l  9B: etween Level Results for the Robustness Check (wit  CEE) 
 
OLS estimation  INTERCEPT MIGRATION  INTERCEPT               LIFE SATISFACTION 
Constant  2.171  *  (1.231)  5.561 *** (1.330)
CEE  ‐0.963  ***  (0.358)  ‐1.497 *** (0.343)
Unemployment  ‐0.116  (0.094)  ‐0.201 *  (0.115)
Gini  ‐0.060  (0.043)  ‐0.145 *** (0.041)
Adj. R‐squared  0.327  0.625 
Number of Observations  27  27 
 
Source: authors’ calculations.  
Notes: The dependent variable is a mean country-specific intercept of the decision to migrate (life satisfaction) from the within level.  
Robust bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
Notes:
The dependent variable is a mean country-specific intercept of the decision to migrate (life satis-
faction) from the within level. Robust bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the country level
are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 % significance levels, respectively.
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3.A.2. Figures
Figure 3.1:Two-level Modeling of the Decision to Migrate
 
Life Satisfaction Intention to Migrate 
Individual  
Economic/Non-Economic  
Reasons for Migration 
 
Individual Socio-Economic 
Characteristics 
Home Country Characteristics 
(unemployment, GDP per capita, 
quality of governance, etc.) 
Within Level 
Between Level 
Source: constructed by the authors.
Notes: Variables are included into boxes. Arrows originating from variables are hypothesized
causal effects. Arrows originating from country economic and political variables correspond to
equations 3.5a and 3.5b1-3.5b3 and indicate hypothesized direct effects on the migration intention
and life satisfaction, respectively.
Figure 3.2:Survey Questions about Intended Leaves
YES  NO 
“Do you intend to move within country  
or to another country?”
WITHIN 
“Do you intend to move in the next five years? 
OUTSIDE 
INTERNAL LEAVE 
For a few weeks
TEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL LEAVE
PERMANENT 
INTERNATIONAL LEAVE
“How long do you expect to stay abroad?” 
For a few months
For a few years 
For more than a few years 
but not indefinitely 
For the rest of my life 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the Eurobarometer Survey.
Note: In our paper, the response "for more than a few years but not indefinitely" is considered as
the intention to migrate temporarily. However, since a residence permit could be received after a
few years in most countries, this response may also be attributed to permanent international leave.
The estimation results are robust to such a modification.
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